I would caveat that the primary data reported has almost no evidentiary value because of the smalls ample size (n = 41).
I feel that you have a separate issue beyond the existence of scope insensitivity as a phenomenon, and that is that Yudkowsky committed a value judgement when he labelled the phenomenon a production of systematic error. The article linked above describes how scope insensitivity differs from an unbiased utilitarian perspective on aid and concern (it is this latter approach that Yudkowsky would presumably consider correct):
In the specific case of valuations underlying public policy decisions, one would expect that each individual life at risk should be given the same consideration and value, which is a moral principle to which most individuals in western countries would probably agree to. Nonetheless, intuitive tradeoffs and the limits of moral intuitions underlying scope insensitivity in lifesaving contexts can often lead to non-normative and irrational valuations (Reyna & Casillas, 2009).
I feel that you have a separate issue beyond the existence of scope insensitivity as a phenomenon...
the existence of scope insensitivity is not in doubt. in my original post I quite specifically said: “the point I want to discuss is whether it is entirely fair to describe scope insensitivity, as defined in this way, as a “systematic human brain error”?
it isn’t obvious to me what I should or could have done to make that point any more clear.
and that is that Yudkowsky committed a value judgement when he labelled the phenomenon a production of systematic error.
I think what he did was to claim that he knew the one specific reason why people did not donate more money, and with no data whatsoever he attributed that reason to all persons in the study. this is knowledge he could not possibly possess. his claim is therefore false.
and not only that, but he wants to extend that to all cases of scope insensitivity so that he can say of all persons who are insensitive to scope that they have or display a “systematic human brain error.”
I think it is obvious that his claim cannot possibly be correct.
This article (open access) provides a useful summary of scope insensitivity as a phenomenon that is well researched and seems robust:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211368114000795
I would caveat that the primary data reported has almost no evidentiary value because of the smalls ample size (n = 41).
I feel that you have a separate issue beyond the existence of scope insensitivity as a phenomenon, and that is that Yudkowsky committed a value judgement when he labelled the phenomenon a production of systematic error. The article linked above describes how scope insensitivity differs from an unbiased utilitarian perspective on aid and concern (it is this latter approach that Yudkowsky would presumably consider correct):
The link doesn’t seem to work.
Probably meant to be this: “Scope insensitivity: The limits of intuitive valuation of human lives in public policy”, Dickert et al.
the existence of scope insensitivity is not in doubt. in my original post I quite specifically said: “the point I want to discuss is whether it is entirely fair to describe scope insensitivity, as defined in this way, as a “systematic human brain error”?
it isn’t obvious to me what I should or could have done to make that point any more clear.
I think what he did was to claim that he knew the one specific reason why people did not donate more money, and with no data whatsoever he attributed that reason to all persons in the study. this is knowledge he could not possibly possess. his claim is therefore false.
and not only that, but he wants to extend that to all cases of scope insensitivity so that he can say of all persons who are insensitive to scope that they have or display a “systematic human brain error.”
I think it is obvious that his claim cannot possibly be correct.
thank you