Many things are called theories, but they are not all the same sort of thing. I know little of critical theory or cultural theory, but I have a very slight acquaintance with music theory, so let me say what sort of thing that appears to be to me, and ask if these other “theories”, including systems theory, are a similar sort of thing.
Musical theory is not the same sort of thing as the theory of Newtonian mechanics. It is more like (pre-neo-Darwinian) biological taxonomy (although different in important ways I’ll come to). That is, it is an activity of classifying things into a framework, a structure of concepts. It makes no predictions, other than that these regularities will continue to be observed. Just as in taxonomy: when you come across a creature that you identify as a heron, you can be sure of a lot of things that you will subsequently observe if you follow it around. But there is no biology here: the classification is based purely on the appearance (perhaps including the results of microscopy) and behaviour of the organism, with no deeper knowledge to tell you how the variety of creatures came to be, or the biochemical processes by which they function. And just as in the history of taxonomy various classification schemes have been proposed, so in music theory there are alternatives to the standard stuff found in elementary textbooks (e.g. Schenkerian theory, Riemannian theory). There are even flamewars over them in internet forums.
Music theory and taxonomy are more like maps of contingent landscapes than a theory predicting things beyond the observed phenomena.
Biological taxonomy differs from music theory in two important ways. Firstly, the organisms exist independently of the taxonomical activity. In contrast, practitioners of music—composers and performers—are influenced by the theories. They create music within the frameworks that were derived from the music before them, or deliberately react against them and invent new theories to compose new sorts of music in, such as serialism.
Secondly, the development of biology has put empirical foundations underneath the taxonomical activity. (Here is a history of that process.)
[ETA: Sometimes to the effect of exposing some of the concepts as purely conventional. We know what physically underlies the concept of a species, and also know how fuzzy it can get. For other parts it has demonstrated that, e.g. there is no such thing as a genus, or a family, or a kingdom, any more than one can empirically distinguish twigs, branches and boughs: all the levels above species are just conventions convenient to have.]
No such empirical foundation exists for music. Composers are free to flout anyone’s theory of what they are doing, and are ultimately bound only by the limits of the human ear.
So, I can read “cultural theory” and “critical theory” as being the same sort of activity as music theory. But that is at the expense of reading them as making true statements about something outside of themselves. They are descriptive maps, or rather, a multitude of competing and conflicting maps of the same territory. In fact, the activity of cultural theory might even be considered to be more like musical performance than musical theory. One does not go to a lecture in the area of cultural theory, critical studies, semiotics, and the like to learn true things, but to experience an intellectually entertaining assemblage of ideas floating as independently of the real world as an interpretation of a Rorschach blot.
What do you think? And where does this leave systems theory? If systems theory were like to musical performance I would have little use for it, but I think its practitioners intend a more solid connection to the real world than that. Perhaps it is like taxonomy? Or something else?
Many things are called theories, but they are not all the same sort of thing. I know little of critical theory or cultural theory, but I have a very slight acquaintance with music theory, so let me say what sort of thing that appears to be to me, and ask if these other “theories”, including systems theory, are a similar sort of thing.
Musical theory is not the same sort of thing as the theory of Newtonian mechanics. It is more like (pre-neo-Darwinian) biological taxonomy (although different in important ways I’ll come to). That is, it is an activity of classifying things into a framework, a structure of concepts. It makes no predictions, other than that these regularities will continue to be observed. Just as in taxonomy: when you come across a creature that you identify as a heron, you can be sure of a lot of things that you will subsequently observe if you follow it around. But there is no biology here: the classification is based purely on the appearance (perhaps including the results of microscopy) and behaviour of the organism, with no deeper knowledge to tell you how the variety of creatures came to be, or the biochemical processes by which they function. And just as in the history of taxonomy various classification schemes have been proposed, so in music theory there are alternatives to the standard stuff found in elementary textbooks (e.g. Schenkerian theory, Riemannian theory). There are even flamewars over them in internet forums.
Music theory and taxonomy are more like maps of contingent landscapes than a theory predicting things beyond the observed phenomena.
Biological taxonomy differs from music theory in two important ways. Firstly, the organisms exist independently of the taxonomical activity. In contrast, practitioners of music—composers and performers—are influenced by the theories. They create music within the frameworks that were derived from the music before them, or deliberately react against them and invent new theories to compose new sorts of music in, such as serialism.
Secondly, the development of biology has put empirical foundations underneath the taxonomical activity. (Here is a history of that process.)
[ETA: Sometimes to the effect of exposing some of the concepts as purely conventional. We know what physically underlies the concept of a species, and also know how fuzzy it can get. For other parts it has demonstrated that, e.g. there is no such thing as a genus, or a family, or a kingdom, any more than one can empirically distinguish twigs, branches and boughs: all the levels above species are just conventions convenient to have.]
No such empirical foundation exists for music. Composers are free to flout anyone’s theory of what they are doing, and are ultimately bound only by the limits of the human ear.
So, I can read “cultural theory” and “critical theory” as being the same sort of activity as music theory. But that is at the expense of reading them as making true statements about something outside of themselves. They are descriptive maps, or rather, a multitude of competing and conflicting maps of the same territory. In fact, the activity of cultural theory might even be considered to be more like musical performance than musical theory. One does not go to a lecture in the area of cultural theory, critical studies, semiotics, and the like to learn true things, but to experience an intellectually entertaining assemblage of ideas floating as independently of the real world as an interpretation of a Rorschach blot.
What do you think? And where does this leave systems theory? If systems theory were like to musical performance I would have little use for it, but I think its practitioners intend a more solid connection to the real world than that. Perhaps it is like taxonomy? Or something else?