I’ve read the majority of the Less Wrong articles on metaethics, and I’m still very very confused. Is this normal or have I missed something important? Is there any sort of consensus on metaethics beyond the ruling out of the very obviously wrong?
Your response is normal—the metaethics sequence is quite opaque, especially compared to others, like the “Mysterious Questions” sequence.
I’m doubtful there is much consensus on the correct metaethics in this community—anecdotal evidence is that there isn’t even consensus on the meaning of the technical vocabulary we use. For an intermediate look into some of the issues, I suggest the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on moral realism and moral anti-realism
Also, I recently realized in discussions that realism is a two place word, not a one place word. Thus, some inferential distance in these types of discussions is between those use the label “moral realism” to refer to realism(morality, agent) and those who refer to realism(morality, humanity).
Thanks for this. I’m already aware of all of the definitions you’ve mentioned, and in fact I don’t like to use the word realism because of the ambiguity.
Is there an obvious next step, once you realise what the options are and what the questions are, or are there only the hard questions left?
It depends on what you think the next questions are. Uncertainty about the truth of moral realism1, moral realism2, or anti-realism leads the inquiry in one direction. If one is satisfied with the meta-ethical issue, object level moral questions predominate—and probably must be approached differently depending on one’s meta-ethical commitments.
If you are unsure about what the next step is, I might recommend reading Camus’ “The Stranger” and examining what you think the main character is doing wrong—that should help you focus your interest on object-level ethics or meta-ethics.
I’ve read the majority of the Less Wrong articles on metaethics, and I’m still very very confused. Is this normal or have I missed something important? Is there any sort of consensus on metaethics beyond the ruling out of the very obviously wrong?
Your response is normal—the metaethics sequence is quite opaque, especially compared to others, like the “Mysterious Questions” sequence.
I’m doubtful there is much consensus on the correct metaethics in this community—anecdotal evidence is that there isn’t even consensus on the meaning of the technical vocabulary we use. For an intermediate look into some of the issues, I suggest the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on moral realism and moral anti-realism
Also, I recently realized in discussions that realism is a two place word, not a one place word. Thus, some inferential distance in these types of discussions is between those use the label “moral realism” to refer to realism(morality, agent) and those who refer to realism(morality, humanity).
Thanks for this. I’m already aware of all of the definitions you’ve mentioned, and in fact I don’t like to use the word realism because of the ambiguity.
Is there an obvious next step, once you realise what the options are and what the questions are, or are there only the hard questions left?
It depends on what you think the next questions are. Uncertainty about the truth of moral realism1, moral realism2, or anti-realism leads the inquiry in one direction. If one is satisfied with the meta-ethical issue, object level moral questions predominate—and probably must be approached differently depending on one’s meta-ethical commitments.
If you are unsure about what the next step is, I might recommend reading Camus’ “The Stranger” and examining what you think the main character is doing wrong—that should help you focus your interest on object-level ethics or meta-ethics.