The officially stated position of Russia is not to get involved in a conventional war with NATO (that Russia knows it can’t win) and immediately escalate to a “limited” nuclear war (that they believe they can win). It appears that (from the Russian standpoint) the nuclear “escalation ladder” looks as this:
- kaboom
- Tactical nuclear strike against a single (non-nuclear) NATO state in Western Europe
-Massive tactical nuclear strikes against (non-nuclear) NATO state(s) in Western Europe
-Tactical nuclear strike(s) against nuclear NATO states, but outside the territory of US, GB and France
-KABOOM
and, from Russia’s standpoint, an advance from one step of the ladder to the next are not automatic.
On the other hand, from the US military planner’s standpoint, the movements from one step of the ladder to the next are also not automatic, but even the second step of the ladder poses such a huge problem that a non-military response to “kaboom”, e.g. an attempt to persuade India and China to join sanctions and further isolate Russia, seems more likely than a direct military response.
In addition, the process can be deescalated at any step of the ladder, at least in theory. It follows that the probability of moving from “kaboom” to “KABOOM” is (much) lower than you assume.
The officially stated position of Russia is not to get involved in a conventional war with NATO (that Russia knows it can’t win) and immediately escalate to a “limited” nuclear war (that they believe they can win). It appears that (from the Russian standpoint) the nuclear “escalation ladder” looks as this:
- kaboom
- Tactical nuclear strike against a single (non-nuclear) NATO state in Western Europe
-Massive tactical nuclear strikes against (non-nuclear) NATO state(s) in Western Europe
-Tactical nuclear strike(s) against nuclear NATO states, but outside the territory of US, GB and France
-KABOOM
and, from Russia’s standpoint, an advance from one step of the ladder to the next are not automatic.
On the other hand, from the US military planner’s standpoint, the movements from one step of the ladder to the next are also not automatic, but even the second step of the ladder poses such a huge problem that a non-military response to “kaboom”, e.g. an attempt to persuade India and China to join sanctions and further isolate Russia, seems more likely than a direct military response.
In addition, the process can be deescalated at any step of the ladder, at least in theory. It follows that the probability of moving from “kaboom” to “KABOOM” is (much) lower than you assume.