It could be the classic issue of enemies misunderstanding each other/modeling each other very badly.
I think pre-invasion, Putin had a lot more effective options for bothering the US/NATO, causing them to slip, etc. For example, he could have kept moving troops around at his borders in ambiguous ways, or put a ton of nukes out on Kaliningrad, with big orange nuclear signs all over them, or etc, etc. But he misread the situation.
Which I think the US also does, and has done in more wars than it has not (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, or any other place where “They’re going to throw down their weapons and welcome us as liberators.”)
Truly, knowing the psychological models of the enemy is rare and non-trivial.
It could be the classic issue of enemies misunderstanding each other/modeling each other very badly.
I think pre-invasion, Putin had a lot more effective options for bothering the US/NATO, causing them to slip, etc. For example, he could have kept moving troops around at his borders in ambiguous ways, or put a ton of nukes out on Kaliningrad, with big orange nuclear signs all over them, or etc, etc. But he misread the situation.
Which I think the US also does, and has done in more wars than it has not (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, or any other place where “They’re going to throw down their weapons and welcome us as liberators.”)
Truly, knowing the psychological models of the enemy is rare and non-trivial.