P-zombies are indeed all about epiphenomenalism. Go check out David Chalmers’ exposition for the standard usage. I think the problem with epiphenominalism is that it’s treating ignorance as a positive license to intoduce its epiphenomenal essence.
We know that the brain in your body does all sorts of computational work, and does things that function like memory, and planning, and perception, and being affected by emotions. We might even use a little poetic language and say that there is “someone home” in your body—that it’s convenient and natural to treat this body as a person with mental attributes. But it is the unsolved Hard Problem of Consciousness, as some would say, to prove that the person home in your body is you. We could have an extra consciousness-essence attached to these bodies, they say. You can’t prove we don’t!
When it comes to denying qualia, I think Dennett would bring up the anecdote about magic from Lee Siegel:
“I’m writing a book on magic”, I explain, and I’m asked, “Real magic?” By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical acts, and supernatural powers. “No”, I answer: “Conjuring tricks, not real magic”. Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic.”
Dennett thinks peoples’ expectations are that “real qualia” are the things that live in the space of epiphenomenal essences and can’t possibly be the equivalent of a conjuring trick.
. But it is the unsolved Hard Problem of Consciousness, as some would say, to prove that the person home in your body is you. We could have an extra consciousness-essence attached to these bodies, they say. You can’t prove we don’t!
It has virtually nothing to do with personal identity.
Dennett thinks peoples’ expectations are that “real qualia” are the things that live in the space of epiphenomenal essences and can’t possibly be the equivalent of a conjuring trick.
If they are a trick,. no one has explained how it is pulled off.
P-zombies are indeed all about epiphenomenalism. Go check out David Chalmers’ exposition for the standard usage. I think the problem with epiphenominalism is that it’s treating ignorance as a positive license to intoduce its epiphenomenal essence.
We know that the brain in your body does all sorts of computational work, and does things that function like memory, and planning, and perception, and being affected by emotions. We might even use a little poetic language and say that there is “someone home” in your body—that it’s convenient and natural to treat this body as a person with mental attributes. But it is the unsolved Hard Problem of Consciousness, as some would say, to prove that the person home in your body is you. We could have an extra consciousness-essence attached to these bodies, they say. You can’t prove we don’t!
When it comes to denying qualia, I think Dennett would bring up the anecdote about magic from Lee Siegel:
“I’m writing a book on magic”, I explain, and I’m asked, “Real magic?” By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical acts, and supernatural powers. “No”, I answer: “Conjuring tricks, not real magic”. Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic.”
Dennett thinks peoples’ expectations are that “real qualia” are the things that live in the space of epiphenomenal essences and can’t possibly be the equivalent of a conjuring trick.
No, they are primarily about explanation.
It has virtually nothing to do with personal identity.
If they are a trick,. no one has explained how it is pulled off.