Also, what are LessWrong’s views on the idea of a continuous consciousness?
It’s kind of against the moderation guidelines of “Make personal statements instead of statements that try to represent a group consensus” for anyone to try to answer that question hahah =P
But, authentically relating just for myself as a product of the local meditations: There is no reason to think continuity of anthropic measure uh.. exists? On a metaphysical level. We can conclude from Clones in Rooms style thought experiments that different clumps of matter have different probabilities of observing their own existence (different quantities of anthropic measure or observer-moments) but we have no reason to think that their observer-moments are linked together in any special way. Our memories are not evidence of that. If your subjectivity-mass was in someone else, a second ago, you wouldn’t know.
An agent is allowed to care about the observer-states that have some special physical relationship to their previous observer-states, but nothing in decision theory or epistemology will tell you what those physical relationships have to be. Maybe the agent does not identify with itself after teleportation, or after sleeping, or after blinking. That comes down to the utility function, not the metaphysics.
It’s kind of against the moderation guidelines of “Make personal statements instead of statements that try to represent a group consensus” for anyone to try to answer that question hahah =P
But, authentically relating just for myself as a product of the local meditations: There is no reason to think continuity of anthropic measure uh.. exists? On a metaphysical level. We can conclude from Clones in Rooms style thought experiments that different clumps of matter have different probabilities of observing their own existence (different quantities of anthropic measure or observer-moments) but we have no reason to think that their observer-moments are linked together in any special way. Our memories are not evidence of that. If your subjectivity-mass was in someone else, a second ago, you wouldn’t know.
An agent is allowed to care about the observer-states that have some special physical relationship to their previous observer-states, but nothing in decision theory or epistemology will tell you what those physical relationships have to be. Maybe the agent does not identify with itself after teleportation, or after sleeping, or after blinking. That comes down to the utility function, not the metaphysics.