Human biology probably doesn’t change much on (merely) historical timescales, but human societies certainly do and human brains are pretty malleable.
Except we’re talking about human political philosophies, not individual people. Thus it makes no sense to consider political philosophies and societies as extrinsic to our model.
I am not arguing that everything backward-looking is bad because Hitler was bad. (Though, actually, most of us would do well to eat less sugar.)
For that matter, in this thread I haven’t been arguing even that Nazism is bad, though as it happens I’m not a fan. Merely observing that there’s a considerable overlap between the backward-looking things neoreactionaries advocate and the backward-looking things the Nazis were keen on.
And, as it happens, I am quite comfortable saying that in many respects “nearly everyone before the 19th century” had views and attitudes that I dislike and disapprove of; if I make a list of Things I Dislike About Nazism and it turns out that they’re mostly also things I dislike about the fifteenth century, my conclusion will be “so much the worse for the fifteenth century”. I already know I wouldn’t want to live there; I already know that “nearly everyone” in the past was wrong about huge swathes of how-the-world-works stuff that we’ve discovered since; why should I be discomfited to find their values also meeting with my disapproval?
(One possible reason: “That would imply that almost everyone until recently was a Bad Person, but that lots of people now are not Bad People, which would mean a bigger faster change in human nature than is plausible.” But people’s values aren’t in fact mere manifestations of their genes, they also come from the surrounding society, and societies can change quickly. It could be that most people would be (what I would consider) Bad if brought up in one society and (what I would consider) Not So Bad if brought up in a different one.)
it makes no sense to consider political philosophies and societies as extrinsic to our model.
My apologies for being dim, but I’m not sure what it is you think I’m doing that I shouldn’t. What model am I treating what as extrinsic to?
OK, I looked at that. I’m afraid doing so hasn’t answered my question.
(It may be worth saying explicitly, though, that my comments here aren’t intended to address the question of whether bombing the hell out of Nazi Germany was an effective way of getting rid of Nazism in Germany, or the possibly-analogous question of whether bombing the hell out of ISIS-occupied Syria would be an effective way of getting rid of fundamentalist Islamic terrorist dictatorship in Syria, or the higher-level question of whether and to what extent you can get rid of ideas with bombs. I think I kinda agree with you about the first, am inclined to disagree about the second but would need to see some more joined-up thinking on the subject than seems generally to be on offer before forming strong opinions, and suspect the third is too vague to be able to say anything useful about.)
I know what the outcome of WW2 was but not what the outcome of bombing or invading Syria will be. WW2 was a huge affair in which several major nations expended pretty much all the effort they could to beat the Axis powers; it is vanishingly unlikely that anything like as much will be done to ISIS. There wasn’t a great deal of sympathy for Nazism in the rest of the world, but there’s plenty of Islamic fundamentalism outside ISIS.
There wasn’t a great deal of sympathy for Nazism in the rest of the world
In the 1930s, yes there was. There wasn’t much by 1945, but that was because people saw what happened to the Nazis and were basically going “despite appearances to the contrary, we never really liked the Nazis we swear, please don’t do that to us”.
Yes, and Hitler ate sugar.
Except we’re talking about human political philosophies, not individual people. Thus it makes no sense to consider political philosophies and societies as extrinsic to our model.
I am not arguing that everything backward-looking is bad because Hitler was bad. (Though, actually, most of us would do well to eat less sugar.)
For that matter, in this thread I haven’t been arguing even that Nazism is bad, though as it happens I’m not a fan. Merely observing that there’s a considerable overlap between the backward-looking things neoreactionaries advocate and the backward-looking things the Nazis were keen on.
And, as it happens, I am quite comfortable saying that in many respects “nearly everyone before the 19th century” had views and attitudes that I dislike and disapprove of; if I make a list of Things I Dislike About Nazism and it turns out that they’re mostly also things I dislike about the fifteenth century, my conclusion will be “so much the worse for the fifteenth century”. I already know I wouldn’t want to live there; I already know that “nearly everyone” in the past was wrong about huge swathes of how-the-world-works stuff that we’ve discovered since; why should I be discomfited to find their values also meeting with my disapproval?
(One possible reason: “That would imply that almost everyone until recently was a Bad Person, but that lots of people now are not Bad People, which would mean a bigger faster change in human nature than is plausible.” But people’s values aren’t in fact mere manifestations of their genes, they also come from the surrounding society, and societies can change quickly. It could be that most people would be (what I would consider) Bad if brought up in one society and (what I would consider) Not So Bad if brought up in a different one.)
My apologies for being dim, but I’m not sure what it is you think I’m doing that I shouldn’t. What model am I treating what as extrinsic to?
You may want to look at how this thread started.
OK, I looked at that. I’m afraid doing so hasn’t answered my question.
(It may be worth saying explicitly, though, that my comments here aren’t intended to address the question of whether bombing the hell out of Nazi Germany was an effective way of getting rid of Nazism in Germany, or the possibly-analogous question of whether bombing the hell out of ISIS-occupied Syria would be an effective way of getting rid of fundamentalist Islamic terrorist dictatorship in Syria, or the higher-level question of whether and to what extent you can get rid of ideas with bombs. I think I kinda agree with you about the first, am inclined to disagree about the second but would need to see some more joined-up thinking on the subject than seems generally to be on offer before forming strong opinions, and suspect the third is too vague to be able to say anything useful about.)
I never said one could get rid of an idea with bombs. Bombs + boots on the ground, on the other hand.
Why the difference? This sounds like a classic near mode/far mode thinking split.
Even if you kill all of ISIS that won’t destroy fundamentalist Islam. There are enough other sources of that in the middle East.
I know what the outcome of WW2 was but not what the outcome of bombing or invading Syria will be. WW2 was a huge affair in which several major nations expended pretty much all the effort they could to beat the Axis powers; it is vanishingly unlikely that anything like as much will be done to ISIS. There wasn’t a great deal of sympathy for Nazism in the rest of the world, but there’s plenty of Islamic fundamentalism outside ISIS.
In the 1930s, yes there was. There wasn’t much by 1945, but that was because people saw what happened to the Nazis and were basically going “despite appearances to the contrary, we never really liked the Nazis we swear, please don’t do that to us”.