If this were the case, it makes sense to hold dogs (rather than their owners, or their breeding) responsible for aggressive or violent behaviour.
I’d consider whether punishing the dog would make the world better, or whether changing the system that led to its breeding, or providing incentives to the owner or any combination of other actions would be most effective.
Consequentialism is about considering the consequences of actions to judge them, but various people might wield this in various ways. Implicitly, with this concept of responsibility, you’re considering a deontological approach to bad behavior: punish the guilty (perhaps using consequentialism to determine who’s guilty though that’s unclear from your argumentation afaict).
In an idealized case, I care about whether the environment I evolve in (including other people’s and other people’s dogs’ actions) is performing well only insofar as I can change it, or said otherwise, I care only about how I can perform better.
(Then, because the world is messy, and I need to account for coordination with other people whose intuitions might not match mine, and society’s recommendations, and my own human impulses etc… My moral system is only an intuition pump for lack of satisfactory metaethics.)
Epistemic status: amateur, personal intuitions.
I’d consider whether punishing the dog would make the world better, or whether changing the system that led to its breeding, or providing incentives to the owner or any combination of other actions would be most effective.
Consequentialism is about considering the consequences of actions to judge them, but various people might wield this in various ways.
Implicitly, with this concept of responsibility, you’re considering a deontological approach to bad behavior: punish the guilty (perhaps using consequentialism to determine who’s guilty though that’s unclear from your argumentation afaict).
In an idealized case, I care about whether the environment I evolve in (including other people’s and other people’s dogs’ actions) is performing well only insofar as I can change it, or said otherwise, I care only about how I can perform better.
(Then, because the world is messy, and I need to account for coordination with other people whose intuitions might not match mine, and society’s recommendations, and my own human impulses etc… My moral system is only an intuition pump for lack of satisfactory metaethics.)