Berkely’s argument caused a fair amount of incredulity at the time. Samuel Johnon’s Argumentum ad Lapidum was intended as a reponse.
This seems like incredulity at his conclusion, rather than at his argument. Do you know of good criticisms of the master argument from the time? (Note it wasn’t given a standard name until the 1970s.)
To be clear, I think Berkeley was near-universally rejected at the time, because his conclusion (‘there’s no material world’) was so wild. Most people also didn’t understand what Berkeley was saying, even though he was pretty clear about it (see: Kant’s misunderstanding; and the above fallacious counterargument, assuming it wasn’t just a logically rude joke on Johnson’s part).
But I don’t update positively about people for rejecting silly-sounding conclusions just based on how silly they sound. The same “that sounds silly” heuristic that helps you reject Berkeley’s argument (when it’s fringe and ‘wears its absurdity on its sleeve’) helps you accept 19th-century idealists’ versions of the argument (when it’s respectable and framed as the modern/scientific/practical/educated/consensus view on the issue).
BTW, I notice that a lot of people here are persuaded by Aumann’s Agreement Theorem, which is every bit as flawed in my view.
The same “that sounds silly” heuristic that helps you reject Berkeley’s argument (when it’s fringe and ‘wears its absurdity on its sleeve’) helps you accept 19th-century idealists’ versions of the argument (when it’s respectable and framed as the modern/scientific/practical/educated/consensus view on the issue).
I should also emphasize that Berkeley’s idealism is very different from (e.g.) Hegel’s idealism. “Idealism” comes in enough different forms that it’s probably more useful for referring to a historical phenomenon than a particular ideology. (Fortunately, the former is the topic I’m interested in here.)
Aumanns theorem assumes there is no ambiguity or disagreement about what counts as evidence or information in the first place. In the real world, that is the major barrier to achieving agreement.
The same “that sounds silly” heuristic that helps you reject Berkeley’s argument (when it’s fringe and ‘wears its absurdity on its sleeve’) helps you accept 19th-century idealists’ versions of the argument (when it’s respectable and framed as the modern/scientific/practical/educated/consensus view on the issue).
Well, maybe that is right. You haven’t really argued against sophisticated idealism, or noticed that scientific realism has dumb forms.
Berkely’s argument caused a fair amount of incredulity at the time. Samuel Johnon’s Argumentum ad Lapidum was intended as a reponse.
BTW, I notice that a lot of people here are persuaded by Aumann’s Agreement Theorem, which is every bit as flawed in my view.
This seems like incredulity at his conclusion, rather than at his argument. Do you know of good criticisms of the master argument from the time? (Note it wasn’t given a standard name until the 1970s.)
To be clear, I think Berkeley was near-universally rejected at the time, because his conclusion (‘there’s no material world’) was so wild. Most people also didn’t understand what Berkeley was saying, even though he was pretty clear about it (see: Kant’s misunderstanding; and the above fallacious counterargument, assuming it wasn’t just a logically rude joke on Johnson’s part).
But I don’t update positively about people for rejecting silly-sounding conclusions just based on how silly they sound. The same “that sounds silly” heuristic that helps you reject Berkeley’s argument (when it’s fringe and ‘wears its absurdity on its sleeve’) helps you accept 19th-century idealists’ versions of the argument (when it’s respectable and framed as the modern/scientific/practical/educated/consensus view on the issue).
Flawed how?
I should also emphasize that Berkeley’s idealism is very different from (e.g.) Hegel’s idealism. “Idealism” comes in enough different forms that it’s probably more useful for referring to a historical phenomenon than a particular ideology. (Fortunately, the former is the topic I’m interested in here.)
Aumanns theorem assumes there is no ambiguity or disagreement about what counts as evidence or information in the first place. In the real world, that is the major barrier to achieving agreement.
Well, maybe that is right. You haven’t really argued against sophisticated idealism, or noticed that scientific realism has dumb forms.