I don’t think that’s quite the same usage of “moral luck”. According to the technical term, it’s when you, for example, judge someone who was driving drunk and hit a person more harshly than someone who was driving drunk and didn’t hit anyone, all else being equal. In other words, things entirely outside of your control that make the same action more or less blameworthy. Another example, from the link:
For example, consider Nazi collaborators in 1930′s Germany who are condemned for committing morally atrocious acts, even though their very presence in Nazi Germany was due to factors beyond their control (Nagel 1979). Had those very people been transferred by the companies for which they worked to Argentina in 1929, perhaps they would have led exemplary lives. If we correctly morally assess the Nazi collaborators differently from their imaginary counterparts in Argentina, then we have a case of circumstantial moral luck.
I don’t see the difference between this usage and Zack’s/Eliezer’s: the definition given in the SEP link is:
Moral luck occurs when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment despite the fact that a significant aspect of what she is assessed for depends on factors beyond her control.
A situation where all of an agent’s options are blameworthy seems quite clearly to fall within this category.
OK, I suppose it counts as an instance, though I’m not convinced Eliezer intended the phrase in that sense. But it’s certainly one of the instances I’m less interested in.
I don’t think that’s quite the same usage of “moral luck”. According to the technical term, it’s when you, for example, judge someone who was driving drunk and hit a person more harshly than someone who was driving drunk and didn’t hit anyone, all else being equal. In other words, things entirely outside of your control that make the same action more or less blameworthy. Another example, from the link:
I don’t see the difference between this usage and Zack’s/Eliezer’s: the definition given in the SEP link is:
A situation where all of an agent’s options are blameworthy seems quite clearly to fall within this category.
OK, I suppose it counts as an instance, though I’m not convinced Eliezer intended the phrase in that sense. But it’s certainly one of the instances I’m less interested in.
Agreed.