(Contains an unendorsed model, as an example of a fake model.)
What do these sorts of claims all have in common? They don’t take the outgroup seriously. Sure, there might well be some fringe radicals who actually
I disagree slightly with some of the examples. Here is what seems to generalize:
1. Some “ideas”/organizations exist that spread themselves. Intentional or not, if lying offers an advantage, then over time selection of groups (as they arise and die out) may lead to widespread lies/systems of lies.
2. How does one determine whether or not one is dealing with fringe radicals? The label “outgroup” suggests we consider the group we are dealing with to be fringe radicals.
3. What if the outgroup doesn’t “take themselves seriously”? Consider the following example*:
Model: Sex leads to closeness/intimacy. This effect becomes weaker if after being activated, the people in question break up/etc..
There are groups that spread this to argue against sex before marriage.
But an alternative conclusion is that lots of sex is a good thing, as it enables people to become less overwhelmed by strong emotions which cause them to make rash decisions, which leads to marriages that don’t last.
If this were a widespread response to the model, then maybe those groups would stop spreading it because they are using it to argue for something that they value/against something they anti-value.
While the above is a hypothetical, it points at a phenomenon that seems to be widespread—in which groups (and individuals) are not arguing in good faith, and taking them seriously will lead one astray.
*If you remember what post this example is from, let me know so I can add a link to it.
Specific:
If you go around thinking that those who oppose you are all idiots, or crazy people, or innately evil, or just haven’t thought about the situation (unlike you, of course!)… well, I won’t say that you’ll always be wrong, but that sure doesn’t seem like the best way to go about trying to form an accurate model of the world!
If it seems wrong because it involves postulating that there are two types of people, you and everyone else in the world, then that seems easily fixed, by accepting that the conditions observed occur in oneself. (Although this should really be a matter of empirical judgement rather than theory—why should the best way of going about forming an accurate model of the world seem like the best way, when so many people are wrong?)
Everyone is foolish.
Everyone is evil.
Everyone is “crazy”.
Each of these could be a starting point for a more complicated model.
Are people crazy in predictable ways?
Is wisdom randomly distributed throughout the population such that people tend to be wise in one domain but foolish at others, or is wisdom/foolishness a general trait?
Does everyone go about achieving their aims in largely similar ways, such that whether someone is good or evil will depend entirely on circumstance and what people believe they have to gain, or is it largely a subconscious/unreflective phenomena, or are people good and evil generally, or do people tend to be good in some areas but bad in others? And do those areas vary between people and change over time or with circumstance?
(Contains an unendorsed model, as an example of a fake model.)
I disagree slightly with some of the examples. Here is what seems to generalize:
1. Some “ideas”/organizations exist that spread themselves. Intentional or not, if lying offers an advantage, then over time selection of groups (as they arise and die out) may lead to widespread lies/systems of lies.
2. How does one determine whether or not one is dealing with fringe radicals? The label “outgroup” suggests we consider the group we are dealing with to be fringe radicals.
3. What if the outgroup doesn’t “take themselves seriously”? Consider the following example*:
Model: Sex leads to closeness/intimacy. This effect becomes weaker if after being activated, the people in question break up/etc..
There are groups that spread this to argue against sex before marriage.
But an alternative conclusion is that lots of sex is a good thing, as it enables people to become less overwhelmed by strong emotions which cause them to make rash decisions, which leads to marriages that don’t last.
If this were a widespread response to the model, then maybe those groups would stop spreading it because they are using it to argue for something that they value/against something they anti-value.
While the above is a hypothetical, it points at a phenomenon that seems to be widespread—in which groups (and individuals) are not arguing in good faith, and taking them seriously will lead one astray.
*If you remember what post this example is from, let me know so I can add a link to it.
Specific:
If it seems wrong because it involves postulating that there are two types of people, you and everyone else in the world, then that seems easily fixed, by accepting that the conditions observed occur in oneself. (Although this should really be a matter of empirical judgement rather than theory—why should the best way of going about forming an accurate model of the world seem like the best way, when so many people are wrong?)
Everyone is foolish.
Everyone is evil.
Everyone is “crazy”.
Each of these could be a starting point for a more complicated model.
Are people crazy in predictable ways?
Is wisdom randomly distributed throughout the population such that people tend to be wise in one domain but foolish at others, or is wisdom/foolishness a general trait?
Does everyone go about achieving their aims in largely similar ways, such that whether someone is good or evil will depend entirely on circumstance and what people believe they have to gain, or is it largely a subconscious/unreflective phenomena, or are people good and evil generally, or do people tend to be good in some areas but bad in others? And do those areas vary between people and change over time or with circumstance?