I want to share a way of dissolving disagreements. It’s also a style of thinking. I call it “the method of statements”, here’s the description:
Take an idea, theory or argument. Split it into statements of a certain type. (Or multiple types.)
Evaluate the properties of the statements. Do they exist (i.e. can they be defined, does anything connect them)? Can they be used, are they constructive? Are they simple? Are they important? Etc.
Try to extract as much information as possible from those statements.
One rule:
A statement counts as existing even if it can’t be formalized or expressed in a particular epistemology.
When you evaluate an argument with the method of statements, you don’t evaluate the “logic” of the argument or its “model of the world”. You evaluate properties of statements implied by the argument. Do statements in question correlate with something true or interesting?
You also may apply the method to analyzing information. You may split the information about something into statements of a certain type and study the properties of those statements. I can’t define what a “statement” is. It’s the most basic concept. Sometimes “statements” are facts, but not always. “Statements” may even be non-verbal. A set of statements can be defined in any way possible.
I will give a couple of less controversial (for rationalists) examples of applying the method. Then a couple of more controversial examples. And then share a couple of my own ideas in the context of the method. But before this...
Rationalist taboo
There’s a technique called “rationalist taboo”. Imagine a disagreement about this question:
If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound? (on wikipedia)
We may try to resolve the disagreement by trying to replace the label “sound” with its more specific contents. Are we talking about sound waves, the vibration of atoms? Are we talking about the subjective experience of sound? Are we talking about mathematical models and hypothetical imaginary situations? An important point is that we don’t try to define what “sound” is, because it would only lead to a dispute about definitions.
The method of statements is somewhat similar to taboo. But with the method we “taboo” ideas and arguments themselves. We take an idea and replace it with its more specific, more atomic semantic contents. We take a thought and split it into smaller thoughts. It’s “taboo” applied on a different level, a “meta-taboo” applied to the process of thinking itself.
However, rationalist taboo and the method of statements may be in direct conflict. Because rationalist taboo assumes that a “statement” is meaningless if it can’t be formalized or expressed in a particular epistemology.
Reception of ideas
This part of the post is about reception of two LessWrong ideas/topics.
With the usual way of thinking, even if a person is sympathetic enough to LDT they may react like this:
I think the idea of LDT is important, but...
I’m not sure it can be formalized (finished).
I’m not sure I agree with it. It seems to violate such and such principles.
You can get the same results by fixing old decision theories.
Conclusion: “LDT brings up important things, but it’s nothing serious right now”.
(The reaction above is inspired by criticisms of William David MacAskill and Prof. Wolfgang Schwarz)
With the method of statements, being sympathetic enough to LDT automatically entails this (or even more positive) reaction:
There exist two famous types of statements: “causal statements” (in CDT) and “evidential statements” (in EDT). LDT hypothesizes the third type, “logical statements”. The latter statements definitely exist. They can be used in thinking, i.e. they are constructive enough. They are simple enough (“conceptual”). And they are important enough. This already makes LDT a very important thing. Even if you can’t formalize it, even if you can’t make a “pure” LDT.
Logical statements (A) in decision theory are related to another type of logical statements (B): statements about logical uncertainty. We have to deal with the latter ones even without LDT. Logical statements (A) are also similar to more established albeit not mainstream “superrational statements” (see Superrationality).
Logical statements can be translated into other types of statements. But this doesn’t justify avoiding to talk about them.
Conclusion: “LDT should be important, whatever complications it has”.
The method of statements dissolves a number of things:
It dissolves counter-arguments about formalization: “logical statements” either exist or don’t, and if they do they carry useful information. It doesn’t matter if they can be formalized or not.
It dissolves minor disagreements. “Logical statements” either can or can’t be true. If they can there’s nothing to “disagree” about. And true statements can’t violate any (important) principles.
Some logical suggestions do seem weird and unintuitive at first. But this weirdness may dissolve when you notice that those suggestions are properties of simple statements. If those statements can be true, then there’s nothing weird about the suggestions. At the end of the day, we don’t even have to follow the suggestions while agreeing that the statements are true and important. Statements are sources of information, nothing more and nothing less.
It dissolves the confusion between different possible theories. “Logical statements” are either important or not. If they are, then it doesn’t matter in which language you express them. It doesn’t even matter what theory is correct.
I think the usual way of thinking may be very reasonable but, ultimately, it’s irrational, because it prompts unjust comparisons of ideas and favoring ideas which look more familiar and easier to understand/implement in the short run. With the usual way of thinking it’s very easy to approach something in the wrong way and “miss the point”.
I want to share a way of dissolving disagreements. It’s also a style of thinking. I call it “the method of statements”, here’s the description:
Take an idea, theory or argument. Split it into statements of a certain type. (Or multiple types.)
Evaluate the properties of the statements. Do they exist (i.e. can they be defined, does anything connect them)? Can they be used, are they constructive? Are they simple? Are they important? Etc.
Try to extract as much information as possible from those statements.
One rule:
A statement counts as existing even if it can’t be formalized or expressed in a particular epistemology.
When you evaluate an argument with the method of statements, you don’t evaluate the “logic” of the argument or its “model of the world”. You evaluate properties of statements implied by the argument. Do statements in question correlate with something true or interesting?
You also may apply the method to analyzing information. You may split the information about something into statements of a certain type and study the properties of those statements. I can’t define what a “statement” is. It’s the most basic concept. Sometimes “statements” are facts, but not always. “Statements” may even be non-verbal. A set of statements can be defined in any way possible.
I will give a couple of less controversial (for rationalists) examples of applying the method. Then a couple of more controversial examples. And then share a couple of my own ideas in the context of the method. But before this...
Rationalist taboo
There’s a technique called “rationalist taboo”. Imagine a disagreement about this question:
We may try to resolve the disagreement by trying to replace the label “sound” with its more specific contents. Are we talking about sound waves, the vibration of atoms? Are we talking about the subjective experience of sound? Are we talking about mathematical models and hypothetical imaginary situations? An important point is that we don’t try to define what “sound” is, because it would only lead to a dispute about definitions.
The method of statements is somewhat similar to taboo. But with the method we “taboo” ideas and arguments themselves. We take an idea and replace it with its more specific, more atomic semantic contents. We take a thought and split it into smaller thoughts. It’s “taboo” applied on a different level, a “meta-taboo” applied to the process of thinking itself.
However, rationalist taboo and the method of statements may be in direct conflict. Because rationalist taboo assumes that a “statement” is meaningless if it can’t be formalized or expressed in a particular epistemology.
Reception of ideas
This part of the post is about reception of two LessWrong ideas/topics.
Evaluating Logical decision theory (LDT)
What is Logical Decision Theory (LDT)? You can check out “An Introduction to Logical Decision Theory for Everyone Else”
With the usual way of thinking, even if a person is sympathetic enough to LDT they may react like this:
I think the idea of LDT is important, but...
I’m not sure it can be formalized (finished).
I’m not sure I agree with it. It seems to violate such and such principles.
You can get the same results by fixing old decision theories.
Conclusion: “LDT brings up important things, but it’s nothing serious right now”.
(The reaction above is inspired by criticisms of William David MacAskill and Prof. Wolfgang Schwarz)
With the method of statements, being sympathetic enough to LDT automatically entails this (or even more positive) reaction:
There exist two famous types of statements: “causal statements” (in CDT) and “evidential statements” (in EDT). LDT hypothesizes the third type, “logical statements”. The latter statements definitely exist. They can be used in thinking, i.e. they are constructive enough. They are simple enough (“conceptual”). And they are important enough. This already makes LDT a very important thing. Even if you can’t formalize it, even if you can’t make a “pure” LDT.
Logical statements (A) in decision theory are related to another type of logical statements (B): statements about logical uncertainty. We have to deal with the latter ones even without LDT. Logical statements (A) are also similar to more established albeit not mainstream “superrational statements” (see Superrationality).
Logical statements can be translated into other types of statements. But this doesn’t justify avoiding to talk about them.
Conclusion: “LDT should be important, whatever complications it has”.
The method of statements dissolves a number of things:
It dissolves counter-arguments about formalization: “logical statements” either exist or don’t, and if they do they carry useful information. It doesn’t matter if they can be formalized or not.
It dissolves minor disagreements. “Logical statements” either can or can’t be true. If they can there’s nothing to “disagree” about. And true statements can’t violate any (important) principles.
Some logical suggestions do seem weird and unintuitive at first. But this weirdness may dissolve when you notice that those suggestions are properties of simple statements. If those statements can be true, then there’s nothing weird about the suggestions. At the end of the day, we don’t even have to follow the suggestions while agreeing that the statements are true and important. Statements are sources of information, nothing more and nothing less.
It dissolves the confusion between different possible theories. “Logical statements” are either important or not. If they are, then it doesn’t matter in which language you express them. It doesn’t even matter what theory is correct.
I think the usual way of thinking may be very reasonable but, ultimately, it’s irrational, because it prompts unjust comparisons of ideas and favoring ideas which look more familiar and easier to understand/implement in the short run. With the usual way of thinking it’s very easy to approach something in the wrong way and “miss the point”.
The whole draft is here. (and the newer one is here)
Edit: my latest draft should be here.