I am not sure what ‘accurate moral beliefs’ means. By analogy with ‘accurate scientific beliefs’, it seems as if Mr Danaher is saying there are true morals out there in reality, which I had not thought to be the case, so I am probably confused.
Can anyone clarify my understanding with a brief explanation of what he means?
Well, I suppose I had in mind the fact that any cognitivist metaethics holds that moral propositions have truth values, i.e. are capable of being true or false. And if cognitivism is correct, then it would be possible for one’s moral beliefs to be more or less accurate (i.e. to be more or less representative of the actual truth values of sets of moral propositions).
While moral cognitivism is most at home with moral realism—the view that moral facts are observer-indepedent—it is also compatible with some versions of anti-realism, such as the constructivist views I occasionally endorse.
The majority of moral philosophers (a biased sample) are cognitivists, as are most non-moral philosophers that I speak to (pure anecdotal evidence). If one is not a moral cognitivist, then the discussion on my blog post will of course be unpersuasive. But in that case, one might incline towards moral nihilism, which could, as I pointed out, provide some support for the orthogonality thesis.
And yet, several high-status Less Wrongers continue to affirm utilitarianism (specifically, with equal weight for each person in the social welfare function). I have criticized these beliefs in the past (as not, in any way, constraining experience), but have not received a satisfactory response.
And yet, several high-status Less Wrongers continue to affirm utilitarianism with equal weight for each person in the social welfare function. I have criticized these beliefs in the past (as not, in any way, constraining experience), but have not received a satisfactory response.
I’m not sure how that answers my question, or follows from it. Can you clarify?
I am not sure what ‘accurate moral beliefs’ means. By analogy with ‘accurate scientific beliefs’, it seems as if Mr Danaher is saying there are true morals out there in reality, which I had not thought to be the case, so I am probably confused. Can anyone clarify my understanding with a brief explanation of what he means?
Well, I suppose I had in mind the fact that any cognitivist metaethics holds that moral propositions have truth values, i.e. are capable of being true or false. And if cognitivism is correct, then it would be possible for one’s moral beliefs to be more or less accurate (i.e. to be more or less representative of the actual truth values of sets of moral propositions).
While moral cognitivism is most at home with moral realism—the view that moral facts are observer-indepedent—it is also compatible with some versions of anti-realism, such as the constructivist views I occasionally endorse.
The majority of moral philosophers (a biased sample) are cognitivists, as are most non-moral philosophers that I speak to (pure anecdotal evidence). If one is not a moral cognitivist, then the discussion on my blog post will of course be unpersuasive. But in that case, one might incline towards moral nihilism, which could, as I pointed out, provide some support for the orthogonality thesis.
And yet, several high-status Less Wrongers continue to affirm utilitarianism (specifically, with equal weight for each person in the social welfare function). I have criticized these beliefs in the past (as not, in any way, constraining experience), but have not received a satisfactory response.
I’m not sure how that answers my question, or follows from it. Can you clarify?
It wasn’t meant as an attempt to answer your question. I was pointing out that this isn’t only a problem for Danaher.