Yes, but here the right belief is the realization that what connects you to what we traditionally called your future “self”, is nothing supernatural
As before merely rejecting the supernatural doesn’t give you a single correct theory, mainly because it doesn’t give you a single theory. There a many more than two non-soul theories of personal identity (and the one Bensinger was assuming isn’t the one you are assuming).
e. no super-material unified continuous self of extra value:
That’s a flurry of claims. One of the alternatives to the momentary theory of personal identity is the theory that a person is a world-line, a 4D structure—and that’s a materialistic theory.
we don’t have any hint at such stuff;
Perhaps we have no evidence of something with all those properties, but we don’t need something with all those properties to supply one alternative. Bensinger ’s computationalism is also non magical (etc).
So due to the absence of this extra “self”: : “You” are simply this instant’s mind we currently observe from you.
Again, the theory of momentary identity isn’t right just because soul theory is wrong.
But as the only thing that in reality connects you with what we traditionally would have called “your future self”, is your own particular preferences/hopes/
No, since I have never been destructively transported, I am also connected by material continuity. You can hardly call that supernatural!
In the natural world, it turns out to be perfectly predictable from the outside, who this natural successor is: your own body.
Great. So it isn’t all about my values. It’s possible for me to align my subjective sense of identity with objective data.
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Core claim in my post is that the ‘instantaneous’ mind (with its preferences etc., see post) is—if we look closely and don’t forget to keep a healthy dose of skepticism about our intuitions about our own mind/self—sufficient to make sense of what we actually observe. And given this instantaneous mind with its memories and preferences is stuff we can most directly observe without much surprise in it, I struggle to find any competing theories as simple or ‘simpler’ and therefore more compelling (Occam’s razor), as I meant to explain in the post.
As I make very clear in the post, nothing in this suggests other theories are impossible. For everything there can of course be (infinitely) many alternative theories available to explain it. I maintain the one I propose has a particular virtue of simplicity.
Regarding computationalism: I’m not sure whether you meant a very specific ‘flavor’ of computationalism in your comment; but for sure I did not mean to exclude computationalist explanations in general; in fact I’ve defended some strong computationalist position in the past and see what I propose here to be readily applicable to it.
the ‘instantaneous’ mind (with its preferences etc., see post) is*—if we look closely and don’t forget to keep a healthy dose of skepticism about our intuitions about our own mind/self*—sufficient to make sense of what we actually observe
Huh? If you mean my future observations, then you are assuming a future self, and therefore temporally extended self. If you mean my present observations, then they include memories of past observations.
in fact I’ve defended some strong computationalist position in the past
But a computation is an series of steps over time, so it is temporarily extended
As before merely rejecting the supernatural doesn’t give you a single correct theory, mainly because it doesn’t give you a single theory. There a many more than two non-soul theories of personal identity (and the one Bensinger was assuming isn’t the one you are assuming).
That’s a flurry of claims. One of the alternatives to the momentary theory of personal identity is the theory that a person is a world-line, a 4D structure—and that’s a materialistic theory.
Perhaps we have no evidence of something with all those properties, but we don’t need something with all those properties to supply one alternative. Bensinger ’s computationalism is also non magical (etc).
Again, the theory of momentary identity isn’t right just because soul theory is wrong.
No, since I have never been destructively transported, I am also connected by material continuity. You can hardly call that supernatural!
Great. So it isn’t all about my values. It’s possible for me to align my subjective sense of identity with objective data. .
Core claim in my post is that the ‘instantaneous’ mind (with its preferences etc., see post) is—if we look closely and don’t forget to keep a healthy dose of skepticism about our intuitions about our own mind/self—sufficient to make sense of what we actually observe. And given this instantaneous mind with its memories and preferences is stuff we can most directly observe without much surprise in it, I struggle to find any competing theories as simple or ‘simpler’ and therefore more compelling (Occam’s razor), as I meant to explain in the post.
As I make very clear in the post, nothing in this suggests other theories are impossible. For everything there can of course be (infinitely) many alternative theories available to explain it. I maintain the one I propose has a particular virtue of simplicity.
Regarding computationalism: I’m not sure whether you meant a very specific ‘flavor’ of computationalism in your comment; but for sure I did not mean to exclude computationalist explanations in general; in fact I’ve defended some strong computationalist position in the past and see what I propose here to be readily applicable to it.
Huh? If you mean my future observations, then you are assuming a future self, and therefore temporally extended self. If you mean my present observations, then they include memories of past observations.
But a computation is an series of steps over time, so it is temporarily extended