I do not derive from this the equanimity that you do. It matters to me whether I go on existing, and the fact that I won’t be around to know if I don’t does not for me resolve the question of whether to undergo destructive uploading.
Note that the continuity you feel is strictly backwards-looking; we have no way to call up the you of a year ago to confirm that he still agrees that he’s continuous with the you of now. In fact, he is dead, having been destructively transformed into the you of now. So what makes one destructive transformation different from another, as long as the resulting being continues believing he is you?
The desk in front of me is not being continuously destroyed and replaced by a replica. Neither am I. That is the difference between my ordinary passage through time and these (hypothetical, speculative, and not necessarily even possible) scenarios.
I do not derive from this the equanimity that you do. It matters to me whether I go on existing, and the fact that I won’t be around to know if I don’t does not for me resolve the question of whether to undergo destructive uploading.
Note that the continuity you feel is strictly backwards-looking; we have no way to call up the you of a year ago to confirm that he still agrees that he’s continuous with the you of now. In fact, he is dead, having been destructively transformed into the you of now. So what makes one destructive transformation different from another, as long as the resulting being continues believing he is you?
The desk in front of me is not being continuously destroyed and replaced by a replica. Neither am I. That is the difference between my ordinary passage through time and these (hypothetical, speculative, and not necessarily even possible) scenarios.