Your observation of the reading on the scale is true, of course. Your observation that the weight is 51 grams is false.
“This weight masses 51 grams” is not an observation, it’s a theory attempting to explain an observation. It just seems so immediate, so obvious and inarguable, that it feels like an observation.
I think this “rabbit hole” is basically reality. In other words “there is a physical world which we see and hear etc” is a theory which is extremely well supported by our observations. Berkeley’s explanation that there is no physical world, but God exists and is directly causing all of our sensations is an alternate theory, although a rather unlikely one.
Berkeley’s explanation that there is no physical world, but God exists and is directly causing all of our sensations is an alternate theory, although a rather unlikely one.
After I wrote that comment, I realized that the only way of distinguishing that from the physical world hypothesis is by the prior. Because “there is a physical chair which is responsible for some of my experiences when I am in my room and continues to exist even at the times when I’m not experiencing it” predicts entirely the same things as “God has an idea of a chair in my room, and He causes experiences according to that idea.”
So if one is more probable than the other, it would be according to the prior. On the other hand, someone might argue that “there is a physical world that is defined by a certain mathematical theory” and “God exists and has a mental model of a world defined by that same mathematical theory, and produces experiences according to that mental model” may not even be distinct hypotheses. In other words, what exactly does it mean to say that God exists and has a mental mathematical model? And what exactly does it mean to say that a physical world exists according to a mathematical model? Someone might assert that insofar as these predict entirely the same experiences, they are not even different theories, but just different ways of describing the same thing. According to this, Berkeley’s theory would not imply that the chair in my room does not really exist, but rather that “there is a chair in my room” means exactly the same thing as “God’s mental model includes a chair in my room”. So it would still be true to say the chair exists and so on.
Not sure how one would refute that. But assuming they are two different theories, it sure seems like the physical world theory should have a higher prior.
[...] everything beyond photons striking the retina becomes a “theory”.
Isn’t that itself a theory to explain our qualia of vision? If, for example, some versions of the simulation hypothesis were true, even photons and eyes would be a false map, though a useful one.
The confusion here has nothing to do with the meaning of “false,” or the distinction between accuracy and precision.
If I’m using a known 50-g weight to calibrate a scale, and I look at the scale reading (which says “51g”), and thereby conclude that the scale is off by 1g, I don’t think you’re at all justified in concluding that I’ve observed that the weight is 51g.
I mean, I agree that if I had made such an observation, it would be a mistaken observation.
But I don’t agree that I made any such observation in the first place. For example, if you asked me after weighing the weight “What is the mass of the weight?” I would most likely answer “50g,” because being able to say that with confidence is the whole point of using standard-mass callibration weights in the first place.
I am confused. In your example what are you saying your observation is, and do you consider it true or false? Also, what do you consider “known” before the observation?
This is getting stuck in the morass of trying to distinguish between observations and interpretations. I don’t particularly want to discuss the philosophy of qualia.
My point is much simpler. It’s quite common for data points which everyone calls “observations” to be false. Trying to fix that problem is called cleaning the data and can be a huge hassle. In practical terms, if you get a database of observations you cannot assume that all of them are true.
I certainly agree that such data points can be false.
When you chose to disagree with khafra’s claim I thought you were making an actual counterassertion, rather than simply challenging their use of the label “observation” in an indirect way.
That’s trivially not true—consider e.g. measurement error.
OK, let’s consider measurement error.
I have, let’s say, a weight.
It actually masses 50 g.
I put it on a scale and observe that the reading on the scale is “51g.”
On your account, is my observation false?
If so, does your judgment change if it’s a standard weight that I’m using to calibrate the scale?
Your observation of the reading on the scale is true, of course. Your observation that the weight is 51 grams is false.
The distinction between accuracy and precision is relevant here. I am assuming your scale is sufficiently precise.
No, it does not. I am using “false” in the sense of the map not matching the territory. A miscalibrated scale doesn’t help you with that.
“This weight masses 51 grams” is not an observation, it’s a theory attempting to explain an observation. It just seems so immediate, so obvious and inarguable, that it feels like an observation.
I feel this leads into a rabbit hole where everything beyond photons striking the retina becomes a “theory”.
I think this “rabbit hole” is basically reality. In other words “there is a physical world which we see and hear etc” is a theory which is extremely well supported by our observations. Berkeley’s explanation that there is no physical world, but God exists and is directly causing all of our sensations is an alternate theory, although a rather unlikely one.
Yeah, this is basically why probability matters.
What evidence lead you to this conclusion?
After I wrote that comment, I realized that the only way of distinguishing that from the physical world hypothesis is by the prior. Because “there is a physical chair which is responsible for some of my experiences when I am in my room and continues to exist even at the times when I’m not experiencing it” predicts entirely the same things as “God has an idea of a chair in my room, and He causes experiences according to that idea.”
So if one is more probable than the other, it would be according to the prior. On the other hand, someone might argue that “there is a physical world that is defined by a certain mathematical theory” and “God exists and has a mental model of a world defined by that same mathematical theory, and produces experiences according to that mental model” may not even be distinct hypotheses. In other words, what exactly does it mean to say that God exists and has a mental mathematical model? And what exactly does it mean to say that a physical world exists according to a mathematical model? Someone might assert that insofar as these predict entirely the same experiences, they are not even different theories, but just different ways of describing the same thing. According to this, Berkeley’s theory would not imply that the chair in my room does not really exist, but rather that “there is a chair in my room” means exactly the same thing as “God’s mental model includes a chair in my room”. So it would still be true to say the chair exists and so on.
Not sure how one would refute that. But assuming they are two different theories, it sure seems like the physical world theory should have a higher prior.
Isn’t that itself a theory to explain our qualia of vision? If, for example, some versions of the simulation hypothesis were true, even photons and eyes would be a false map, though a useful one.
Hey hallucinations are totally a thing.
The confusion here has nothing to do with the meaning of “false,” or the distinction between accuracy and precision.
If I’m using a known 50-g weight to calibrate a scale, and I look at the scale reading (which says “51g”), and thereby conclude that the scale is off by 1g, I don’t think you’re at all justified in concluding that I’ve observed that the weight is 51g.
I mean, I agree that if I had made such an observation, it would be a mistaken observation.
But I don’t agree that I made any such observation in the first place. For example, if you asked me after weighing the weight “What is the mass of the weight?” I would most likely answer “50g,” because being able to say that with confidence is the whole point of using standard-mass callibration weights in the first place.
I am confused. In your example what are you saying your observation is, and do you consider it true or false? Also, what do you consider “known” before the observation?
I observe that the reading on the scale is “51g,” as I said in the first place.
Yes. True.
All kinds of things. In the case with a standard 50g callibration weight, that includes the mass of the weight.
This is getting stuck in the morass of trying to distinguish between observations and interpretations. I don’t particularly want to discuss the philosophy of qualia.
My point is much simpler. It’s quite common for data points which everyone calls “observations” to be false. Trying to fix that problem is called cleaning the data and can be a huge hassle. In practical terms, if you get a database of observations you cannot assume that all of them are true.
I certainly agree that such data points can be false.
When you chose to disagree with khafra’s claim I thought you were making an actual counterassertion, rather than simply challenging their use of the label “observation” in an indirect way.
My apologies, and I’m happy to drop it here.