Generally, when a person talks about “spirits” they imply the existence of consciousness divorced from a brain (or something similar). This seems to assume “consciousness” as an ontologically basic thing.
They may not describe themselves as having a strong opinion about that, or even thinking of it in those terms, but I don’t see how they could come to the conclusion that spirits exist without the underlying assumption that consciousness is ontologically basic.
Generally, when a person talks about “spirits” they imply the existence of consciousness divorced from a brain (or something similar). This seems to assume “consciousness” as an ontologically basic thing.
Do you disagree, then, that “they may not have any strong opinion on whether the spirits are made of nonmental spirit foam”?
They may not describe themselves as having a strong opinion about that, or even thinking of it in those terms, but I don’t see how they could come to the conclusion that spirits exist without the underlying assumption that consciousness is ontologically basic.