a part of that calculation is that the production for others will result in some extra pleasure down the line
I don’t agree with this view. The person who does things, taken to a high degree, is Leonardo da Vinci. The person who consumes stuff, taken to a high degree, is a kind of couch potato or sea sponge that doesn’t even need much of a brain. Saying that the former is lowly “instrumental” while the latter is lofty “terminal” sounds very wrong to me.
Either Leonardo enjoys what he is doing (in that case there is terminal value for himself) or he is doing it for other people to enjoy (instrumental value) or both (both kinds of value).
In a hypothetical world where neither is true, i.e. Leonardo hates doing things and no one cares whether he does them or not, he should stop doing that.
He enjoys what he’s doing, but that’s not the most important measure. If you offered him a hypothetical harmless drug that could bring him even more enjoyment but stop him from working, he would refuse.
That’s a tautology then, “people want what they want”. If I understood Villiam right, he was making a more substantive point: that all aspects of “what we want” ultimately reduce to pleasure, because it’s intrinsically valuable and (presumably) nothing else is. Which is what I’m arguing against.
The original point was against using energy consumption as a measure of worthiness. It’s true that all worthy things tend to consume energy, but energy consumption isn’t proportional to worthiness, and some things that consume energy aren’t worth anything at all. This holds whether one adopts a purely hedonistic view of utility or not.
I don’t agree with this view. The person who does things, taken to a high degree, is Leonardo da Vinci. The person who consumes stuff, taken to a high degree, is a kind of couch potato or sea sponge that doesn’t even need much of a brain. Saying that the former is lowly “instrumental” while the latter is lofty “terminal” sounds very wrong to me.
Either Leonardo enjoys what he is doing (in that case there is terminal value for himself) or he is doing it for other people to enjoy (instrumental value) or both (both kinds of value).
In a hypothetical world where neither is true, i.e. Leonardo hates doing things and no one cares whether he does them or not, he should stop doing that.
He enjoys what he’s doing, but that’s not the most important measure. If you offered him a hypothetical harmless drug that could bring him even more enjoyment but stop him from working, he would refuse.
But the refusal of wireheading is itself in service of a terminal value—because “satisfaction” is more than simple pleasure.
That’s a tautology then, “people want what they want”. If I understood Villiam right, he was making a more substantive point: that all aspects of “what we want” ultimately reduce to pleasure, because it’s intrinsically valuable and (presumably) nothing else is. Which is what I’m arguing against.
The original point was against using energy consumption as a measure of worthiness. It’s true that all worthy things tend to consume energy, but energy consumption isn’t proportional to worthiness, and some things that consume energy aren’t worth anything at all. This holds whether one adopts a purely hedonistic view of utility or not.