On my understanding of how things work, goals and beliefs combine to make action, so neither one is really mentally closer to action than the other. Both a goal and a belief can be quite far removed from action (eg, a nearly impossible goal which you don’t act on, or a belief about far-away things which don’t influence your day-to-day). Both can be very close (a jump scare seems most closely connected to a belief, whereas deciding to move your hand and then doing so is more goal-like—granted both those examples have complications).
If, in conversation, the distinction comes up explicitly, it is usually because of stuff like this:
Alice makes an unclear statement; it sounds like she could be claiming A or wanting A.
Bob asks for clarification, because Bob’s reaction to believing A is true would be very different from his reaction to believing A is good (or, in more relative terms, knowing Alice endorses one or the other of those). In the first case, Bob might plan under the assumption A; in the second, Bob might make plans designed to make A true.
Alice is engaging in wishful thinking, claiming that something is true when really the opposite is just too terrible to consider.
Bob wants to be able to rely on Alice’s assertions, so Bob is concerned about the possibility of wishful thinking.
Or, Bob is concerned for Alice; Bob doesn’t want Alice to ignore risks due to ignoring negative possibilities, or fail to set up back-up plans for the bad scenarios.
My point is that it doesn’t seem to me like a case of people intuitively breaking up a thing which is scientifically really one phenomena. Predicting A and wanting A seem to have quite different consequences. If you predict A, you tend to restrict attention to cases where it is true when planning; you may plan actions which rely on it. If you want A, you don’t do that; you are very aware of all the cases where not-A. You take actions designed to ensure A.
On my understanding of how things work, goals and beliefs combine to make action, so neither one is really mentally closer to action than the other. Both a goal and a belief can be quite far removed from action (eg, a nearly impossible goal which you don’t act on, or a belief about far-away things which don’t influence your day-to-day). Both can be very close (a jump scare seems most closely connected to a belief, whereas deciding to move your hand and then doing so is more goal-like—granted both those examples have complications).
If, in conversation, the distinction comes up explicitly, it is usually because of stuff like this:
Alice makes an unclear statement; it sounds like she could be claiming A or wanting A.
Bob asks for clarification, because Bob’s reaction to believing A is true would be very different from his reaction to believing A is good (or, in more relative terms, knowing Alice endorses one or the other of those). In the first case, Bob might plan under the assumption A; in the second, Bob might make plans designed to make A true.
Alice is engaging in wishful thinking, claiming that something is true when really the opposite is just too terrible to consider.
Bob wants to be able to rely on Alice’s assertions, so Bob is concerned about the possibility of wishful thinking.
Or, Bob is concerned for Alice; Bob doesn’t want Alice to ignore risks due to ignoring negative possibilities, or fail to set up back-up plans for the bad scenarios.
My point is that it doesn’t seem to me like a case of people intuitively breaking up a thing which is scientifically really one phenomena. Predicting A and wanting A seem to have quite different consequences. If you predict A, you tend to restrict attention to cases where it is true when planning; you may plan actions which rely on it. If you want A, you don’t do that; you are very aware of all the cases where not-A. You take actions designed to ensure A.