I have not read the book so I might not give it justice. But while the topic is greatly worthwhile some of the stories given to explain “the roots of stagnation” seem off to me. I will try to explain why.
On nanotech: the NNI was a US initiative, and it is strange to explain a worldwide setback with a dysfunction of US funding. Europe has a completely different science funding system, with EU-scale funding interacting with different national systems and priorities. A research area that got large centralized funding in the EU is that of nanoscale materials, which above is described as contributing to the death of nanotech in order to get a share of the pot of money. Yet, in both US and EU nanoscale materials research is alive, if with somewhat disappointing results, and nanotech is struggling. You could say that research in the EU is tied to the one in the US, which would be true although there is a complex bidirectional relationship. But other geographical areas are more loosely connected, for example Japan has his own research ecosystem to the point that it often takes me much longer to read a Japanese paper—too many references to things I never heard about. No chance that the NNI killed nanotech in Japan as well. My hypothesis (pure speculation) is that nanotech tried to go for the technological payoff too soon, while they needed ten more years of basic research, improved tools etc.
On nuclear: I don’t think it makes sense to discuss nuclear without mentioning the military applications, i.e. the atomic bomb. I think this contributed to the difficulties of the technology through two channels. One, in the public mind nuclear=scary is a very clear and strong association, so good luck to any attempt to deregulate nuclear power. Second, a top priority of governments has been to limit the access to nuclear technology, i.e. the opposite of free market. They were probably correct: in the world imagined above with at-home nuclear reactors, all countries an many non-state actors would have nuclear bombs. By now we would have had a dozen nuclear wars and al quaeda would have blown up Manhattan instead of just destroying two skyscrapers.
I feel that the author of the book may have approached the subject from a libertarian prospective and concluded unsurprisingly that the government is at fault.
I also have more nebulous doubts on the “counterculture trends” explanation. My feeling is that anti-technology culture has always been there, and pro-technology culture has not really gone away. But explaining myself on the issue would make this wall of text even longer :)
The author does overstate the harm from NNI. Drexler’s vision needed larger-scale coordination than just a bunch of small academic labs that needed to focus on publishing papers. It needed something closer to the Apollo program. The details of NNI are just a small part of the political and cultural changes which made it harder to organize an Apollo program in 2000 than it was in 1960.
The author does have libertarian tendencies, but he implies that libertarianism is less important than the difference between a well-run government and a poorly run government. A fair amount of the book is devoted to analyzing why the US government became worse around 1970.
I have not read the book so I might not give it justice. But while the topic is greatly worthwhile some of the stories given to explain “the roots of stagnation” seem off to me. I will try to explain why.
On nanotech: the NNI was a US initiative, and it is strange to explain a worldwide setback with a dysfunction of US funding. Europe has a completely different science funding system, with EU-scale funding interacting with different national systems and priorities. A research area that got large centralized funding in the EU is that of nanoscale materials, which above is described as contributing to the death of nanotech in order to get a share of the pot of money. Yet, in both US and EU nanoscale materials research is alive, if with somewhat disappointing results, and nanotech is struggling. You could say that research in the EU is tied to the one in the US, which would be true although there is a complex bidirectional relationship. But other geographical areas are more loosely connected, for example Japan has his own research ecosystem to the point that it often takes me much longer to read a Japanese paper—too many references to things I never heard about. No chance that the NNI killed nanotech in Japan as well. My hypothesis (pure speculation) is that nanotech tried to go for the technological payoff too soon, while they needed ten more years of basic research, improved tools etc.
On nuclear: I don’t think it makes sense to discuss nuclear without mentioning the military applications, i.e. the atomic bomb. I think this contributed to the difficulties of the technology through two channels. One, in the public mind nuclear=scary is a very clear and strong association, so good luck to any attempt to deregulate nuclear power. Second, a top priority of governments has been to limit the access to nuclear technology, i.e. the opposite of free market. They were probably correct: in the world imagined above with at-home nuclear reactors, all countries an many non-state actors would have nuclear bombs. By now we would have had a dozen nuclear wars and al quaeda would have blown up Manhattan instead of just destroying two skyscrapers.
I feel that the author of the book may have approached the subject from a libertarian prospective and concluded unsurprisingly that the government is at fault.
I also have more nebulous doubts on the “counterculture trends” explanation. My feeling is that anti-technology culture has always been there, and pro-technology culture has not really gone away. But explaining myself on the issue would make this wall of text even longer :)
The author does overstate the harm from NNI. Drexler’s vision needed larger-scale coordination than just a bunch of small academic labs that needed to focus on publishing papers. It needed something closer to the Apollo program. The details of NNI are just a small part of the political and cultural changes which made it harder to organize an Apollo program in 2000 than it was in 1960.
The author does have libertarian tendencies, but he implies that libertarianism is less important than the difference between a well-run government and a poorly run government. A fair amount of the book is devoted to analyzing why the US government became worse around 1970.