What it is for me to persist is for there to be, instantiated in some system, an algorithm with a particular relation to the algorithm which characterizes me at present. And I don’t think algorithms are physical entities (though, in this universe they seem to be instantiated that way). I suppose you could define “physical” to mean any possible physics but even then the fact that an algorithm is instantiated physically doesn’t mean it is identical to that physical entity (the instantiation). Plus any accurate physical description couldn’t apply to the entirety of possible instantiations.
I gave up trying to talk my self out of Platonism a while ago.
What it is for me to persist is for there to be, instantiated in some system, an algorithm with a particular relation to the algorithm which characterizes me at present.
Emphasis added. I think “instantiates an algorithm of type X” qualifies as a physical specification in the relevant sense; Platonism is not a problem. However to answer the post you would need to define (or point us in the direction of) the “particular relation” you have in mind.
However to answer the post you would need to define (or point us in the direction of) the “particular relation” you have in mind.
The particular relation where x is the future algorithm and y is the algorithm which characterizes me now is ” x is psychologically continuous with y”. If x contains memories of y’s experiences, or if x contains memories of the experiences of intervening algorithms which in turn contain memories of y, or if x and y are linked by any series of algorithms connected in this way we would have good reason to think x is psychologically continuous with y. Though memory connections aren’t sufficient,- you’d also want beliefs, values and emotions to persist or not persist in the right way.
Of course, death is rather flexible. There is no fact of the matter about how continuous with you an algorithm has to be for it to count as you dying.
I don’t think the thing I want to preserve is a physical entity so I don’t think there is a way to correctly define it that way.
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What it is for me to persist is for there to be, instantiated in some system, an algorithm with a particular relation to the algorithm which characterizes me at present. And I don’t think algorithms are physical entities (though, in this universe they seem to be instantiated that way). I suppose you could define “physical” to mean any possible physics but even then the fact that an algorithm is instantiated physically doesn’t mean it is identical to that physical entity (the instantiation). Plus any accurate physical description couldn’t apply to the entirety of possible instantiations.
I gave up trying to talk my self out of Platonism a while ago.
Emphasis added. I think “instantiates an algorithm of type X” qualifies as a physical specification in the relevant sense; Platonism is not a problem. However to answer the post you would need to define (or point us in the direction of) the “particular relation” you have in mind.
The particular relation where x is the future algorithm and y is the algorithm which characterizes me now is ” x is psychologically continuous with y”. If x contains memories of y’s experiences, or if x contains memories of the experiences of intervening algorithms which in turn contain memories of y, or if x and y are linked by any series of algorithms connected in this way we would have good reason to think x is psychologically continuous with y. Though memory connections aren’t sufficient,- you’d also want beliefs, values and emotions to persist or not persist in the right way.
Of course, death is rather flexible. There is no fact of the matter about how continuous with you an algorithm has to be for it to count as you dying.