It’s pretty easy to convincingly demonstrate that that the ratio of the circumference of the circle to its diameter is not 4. I haven’t seen anyone convincingly demonstrate that God (or some god) does not exist.
You regularly disbelieve in things without requiring someone to convincingly demonstrate their falsehood, on the basis that there isn’t reason to suspect that they’re actually true.
Religious conservatism comes down to a number of empirical claims which are either right or wrong, and the fact that we cannot now demonstrate which is correct does not mean that some people are not getting the answer right and some getting it wrong on the basis of the same available evidence.
None of our beliefs are properly treated as certainties
I don’t think this is a useful approach other than for arguing about 3^^^3 angels on Omega’s head.
There is also a serious difference between the Russell’s teapot (or the chocolate cake that’s accompanies the tea) and pi. We don’t expect to find the teapot in orbit, but we haven’t looked. With pi, we have looked and we saw.
Quite a lot of people assign “certainty” to things which later turn out not to be true. Quite often they “check,” but they either check wrong, or they make mistaken inferences from their observations which they do not realize they should doubt.
The fact that we haven’t looked for Russell’s Teapot actually makes very little difference with respect to what we should estimate for its probability. A strong prior is a strong prior.
Are you sure this is a strong prior? Strong priors are relatively unmoved by evidence and evidence of a teapot in orbit would probably demolish that prior fairly thoroughly :-)
Not to mention that there is the whole issue of how that prior came to be. Standard Bayesian reasoning conveniently assumes that priors spring out fully-formed ex nihilo but that’s not a very satisfying approach.
Are you sure this is a strong prior? Strong priors are relatively unmoved by evidence and evidence of a teapot in orbit would probably demolish that prior fairly thoroughly :-)
Strong priors take strong evidence to move them appreciably, but physically going out and finding a teapot would be very strong evidence of a teapot.
On the other hand, if an astronomer using an extremely powerful telescope claimed to find one, then unless you subsequently received serious corroboration, you’d be wiser not to believe it, because the strength of the prior is such that it’s more likely that they’re simply lying or mistaken.
Not to mention that there is the whole issue of how that prior came to be. Standard Bayesian reasoning conveniently assumes that priors spring out fully-formed ex nihilo but that’s not a very satisfying approach.
Your prior in any situation is your best estimate given the information available to you before consolidating some new piece of information, so a prior can in fact be based on extensive observation.
You regularly disbelieve in things without requiring someone to convincingly demonstrate their falsehood, on the basis that there isn’t reason to suspect that they’re actually true.
Religious conservatism comes down to a number of empirical claims which are either right or wrong, and the fact that we cannot now demonstrate which is correct does not mean that some people are not getting the answer right and some getting it wrong on the basis of the same available evidence.
Of course I do. But the question was “is believing in God the same thing as believing that pi=4” and the answer is no, it is not.
LOL. If you cannot demonstrate which one is correct, how do you know which answer is right?
Yes, yes, I know the answer. My point is that is still a probability-based estimation (while, for example, pi=4 is not).
One’s confidence that pi does not equal four is still a probability estimate. None of our beliefs are properly treated as certainties, whether they be in mathematical identities, or in the existence or nonexistence of chocolate cake floating around in the asteroid belt. It’s simply a difference of degree, not of kind.
I don’t think this is a useful approach other than for arguing about 3^^^3 angels on Omega’s head.
There is also a serious difference between the Russell’s teapot (or the chocolate cake that’s accompanies the tea) and pi. We don’t expect to find the teapot in orbit, but we haven’t looked. With pi, we have looked and we saw.
Quite a lot of people assign “certainty” to things which later turn out not to be true. Quite often they “check,” but they either check wrong, or they make mistaken inferences from their observations which they do not realize they should doubt.
The fact that we haven’t looked for Russell’s Teapot actually makes very little difference with respect to what we should estimate for its probability. A strong prior is a strong prior.
Are you sure this is a strong prior? Strong priors are relatively unmoved by evidence and evidence of a teapot in orbit would probably demolish that prior fairly thoroughly :-)
Not to mention that there is the whole issue of how that prior came to be. Standard Bayesian reasoning conveniently assumes that priors spring out fully-formed ex nihilo but that’s not a very satisfying approach.
Strong priors take strong evidence to move them appreciably, but physically going out and finding a teapot would be very strong evidence of a teapot.
On the other hand, if an astronomer using an extremely powerful telescope claimed to find one, then unless you subsequently received serious corroboration, you’d be wiser not to believe it, because the strength of the prior is such that it’s more likely that they’re simply lying or mistaken.
Your prior in any situation is your best estimate given the information available to you before consolidating some new piece of information, so a prior can in fact be based on extensive observation.