I’m not talking about it thinks it perceives red even when it doesn’t perceive red—that’s “tree falls in the forest” thinking. I’m talking about simultaneously thinking you perceive red and not thinking your perceive red.
But yes—you could screw up a mind sufficiently such that it thinks it’s perceiving red and not perceiving red simultaneously. Such a mind isn’t following the normal rules (and the rules of logic and so on arise from the rules of the mind in the first place, so of course you could sufficiently destroy or disable a mind such that it no longer things that way—there’s no deeper justification, so you are forced to trust the normal mental process to some degree...that’s what the “no universally compelling arguments and therefore you just have to yourself” spiel I was giving higher in the thread stems from).
I guess I bite the bullet, there is no real falsifying here? I did say you have to take it on faith to an extent because there is no other way. It’s a foundational premise for building an epistemic structure, not a theory as such.
Anyhow, I’m not sure we’re talking about the same thing anymore. If you don’t accept that the universe follows a certain logic, the idea of “falsifying” has no foundation anyway.
I’m not talking about it thinks it perceives red even when it doesn’t perceive red—that’s “tree falls in the forest” thinking. I’m talking about simultaneously thinking you perceive red and not thinking your perceive red.
But yes—you could screw up a mind sufficiently such that it thinks it’s perceiving red and not perceiving red simultaneously. Such a mind isn’t following the normal rules (and the rules of logic and so on arise from the rules of the mind in the first place, so of course you could sufficiently destroy or disable a mind such that it no longer things that way—there’s no deeper justification, so you are forced to trust the normal mental process to some degree...that’s what the “no universally compelling arguments and therefore you just have to yourself” spiel I was giving higher in the thread stems from).
But you said “that would embody a logical contradiction in the territory” and that doesn’t seem to be so any more.
My original question, if you recall, was for an example of something—anything—that would be falsify your theory.
I guess I bite the bullet, there is no real falsifying here? I did say you have to take it on faith to an extent because there is no other way. It’s a foundational premise for building an epistemic structure, not a theory as such.
Anyhow, I’m not sure we’re talking about the same thing anymore. If you don’t accept that the universe follows a certain logic, the idea of “falsifying” has no foundation anyway.