I feel like the sibling comment gives some idea of that, but I’ll try to explain it more. If you have a collection of worlds, in order to get their probabilistic expectations to line up with experiment you need conditional fractions to hold: conditioned on having been in world A, I am in world B after t time with probability .5 and in world C after t time with probability .5. But the number of worlds that look like B is not constrained by the model, and whether the worlds are stored as “A” or the group of (“AB”, “AC”) also seems unconstrained (the nonexistence of local variables is different; it just constrains what a “world” can mean).
And so given the freedom over the number of worlds and how they’re stored, you can come up with a number of different interpretations that look mathematically equivalent to me, which hopefully also means they’re psychologically equivalent.
I feel like the sibling comment gives some idea of that, but I’ll try to explain it more. If you have a collection of worlds, in order to get their probabilistic expectations to line up with experiment you need conditional fractions to hold: conditioned on having been in world A, I am in world B after t time with probability .5 and in world C after t time with probability .5. But the number of worlds that look like B is not constrained by the model, and whether the worlds are stored as “A” or the group of (“AB”, “AC”) also seems unconstrained (the nonexistence of local variables is different; it just constrains what a “world” can mean).
And so given the freedom over the number of worlds and how they’re stored, you can come up with a number of different interpretations that look mathematically equivalent to me, which hopefully also means they’re psychologically equivalent.