You’ve given several examples where our knowledge is incomplete. I agree! And I hope that any economist would explicitly say that there’s no settled explanation for the Great Depression, or the Great Recession, or Japan’s Lost Decade.
If the state of the art cutting edge economic research is that “there’s no settled explanation” for Japan’s Lost Decades (plural, since we’re well into multiple decades, I think), then how on earth could the simple models taught to undergraduates not have “huge problems” dealing with these “real world” events?
If the state of the art...is that “there’s no settled explanation” for Japan’s Lost Decades...then how on earth could the simple models taught to undergraduates not have “huge problems” dealing with these “real world” events?
I don’t see how this follows.
Suppose we teach a theory that says things in set X can be caused by things in set Y={A,B,C}. Then I say “there’s substantial argument about whether major event x in X was caused by A or by B.”
This does not mean the theory has “huge problems” dealing with real world events! It just lacks the power to distinguish between causes from within the set Y.
In the same way, economists argue about the causes of things like the Great Depression, Lost Decade, and Great Recession, but they mostly agree about the sort of causes they need to consider, and they have a common framework to think about them in (or at worst a few competing frameworks).
This does not mean the theory has “huge problems” dealing with real world events! It just lacks the power to distinguish between causes from within the set Y.
Then it’s not a theory capable of explaining the event at all. If all you can do is throw together a variety of heterogenous contradictory theories, you haven’t explained an event.
I’m reminded of Wittgenstein, now, on family resemblances—of course one could define “a game” as an indefinitely long disjunction of possibilities “a game is anything which is either Backgammon OR chess OR go OR Halo OR tossing a ball OR soccer...” but having giving this disjunction, in what sense has one actually conveyed what a game is? Same thing here.
In the same way, economists argue about the causes of things like the Great Depression, Lost Decade, and Great Recession, but they mostly agree about the sort of causes they need to consider, and they have a common framework to think about them in (or at worst a few competing frameworks).
I believe that however we explain the Lost Decades, it will involve materialism and not souls. Do I have a perfectly satisfactory theory capable of explaining the Lost Decades? No, of course not.
Then it’s not a theory capable of explaining the event at all.
Are you really claiming that a theory that restricts the possible causes of an event to three has not explained the event “at all”?
Under this definition, I agree that undergraduate macroeconomics cannot explain the real world. But surely this is a rather restrictive standard for “explanation”?
I would rather say that a theory that allows us to concentrate a lot of probability mass on Y upon observing an element in X, or to concentrate a lot of probability mass on X after observing an element in Y, is doing quite a bit of explanatory work!
Are you really claiming that a theory that restricts the possible causes of an event to three has not explained the event “at all”?
This isn’t a case of 1 theory which predict the cause as being 3 different possible causes. We’re talking 3 entire competing paradigms, and then yeah, pretty much. “We think you’re sick either because people get cancer, or they have 4 bodily humors which get imbalanced, or it’s all due to malignant airs. We doctors haven’t figured out which is the right paradigm, but rest assured as you die: probably one of the 3 paradigms is right!” I sure as heck wouldn’t go around saying “medicine has it all figured out”.
So. As I said originally: macro cannot agree on an explanation for any of the events I listed, and my examples fit your demand for examples.
We think you’re sick either because people get cancer, or they have 4 bodily humors which get imbalanced, or it’s all due to malignant airs. We doctors haven’t figured out which is the right paradigm, but rest assured as you die: probably one of the 3 paradigms is right!
There isn’t this much disagreement over macro. Especially undergrad macro.
As I said originally: macro cannot agree on an explanation for any of the events I listed, and my examples fit your demand for examples.
And I explained how one could use the models taught in macro principles to think about each example.
There isn’t this much disagreement over macro. Especially undergrad macro.
The undergrad macro you’ve already described as so simplified that it doesn’t apply to real world situations and ignores the controversy between feuding schools which bars any kind of consensus.
And I explained how one could use the models taught in macro principles to think about each example.
“With this undergrad course in the 4 humors, I hope that you will be able to use the basic principles of melancholy vs choleric etc to interpret the illnesses and personalities you see around you...”
Whatever. I’m done. I provided the relevant examples, you acknowledge that there is indeed no consensus about them, and that’s all that was needed.
Should one skip right to graduate level macroeconomics, then? Or are there companion resources one might want to consume concurrently with learning undergraduate level macro? A previous poster recommended learning undergrad with a healthy dose of scepticism; if that scepticism were applied to half-truths taught in undergrad macro, would the supposed activity of ‘learning about economics’ become an exercise in comparing maps to their charted territory?
I am not sure that given the state of the art, macro is worth learning at all at any level for people who do not plan to go into academia specializing in macro.
If the state of the art cutting edge economic research is that “there’s no settled explanation” for Japan’s Lost Decades (plural, since we’re well into multiple decades, I think), then how on earth could the simple models taught to undergraduates not have “huge problems” dealing with these “real world” events?
I don’t see how this follows.
Suppose we teach a theory that says things in set X can be caused by things in set Y={A,B,C}. Then I say “there’s substantial argument about whether major event x in X was caused by A or by B.”
This does not mean the theory has “huge problems” dealing with real world events! It just lacks the power to distinguish between causes from within the set Y.
In the same way, economists argue about the causes of things like the Great Depression, Lost Decade, and Great Recession, but they mostly agree about the sort of causes they need to consider, and they have a common framework to think about them in (or at worst a few competing frameworks).
Then it’s not a theory capable of explaining the event at all. If all you can do is throw together a variety of heterogenous contradictory theories, you haven’t explained an event.
I’m reminded of Wittgenstein, now, on family resemblances—of course one could define “a game” as an indefinitely long disjunction of possibilities “a game is anything which is either Backgammon OR chess OR go OR Halo OR tossing a ball OR soccer...” but having giving this disjunction, in what sense has one actually conveyed what a game is? Same thing here.
I believe that however we explain the Lost Decades, it will involve materialism and not souls. Do I have a perfectly satisfactory theory capable of explaining the Lost Decades? No, of course not.
Are you really claiming that a theory that restricts the possible causes of an event to three has not explained the event “at all”?
Under this definition, I agree that undergraduate macroeconomics cannot explain the real world. But surely this is a rather restrictive standard for “explanation”?
I would rather say that a theory that allows us to concentrate a lot of probability mass on Y upon observing an element in X, or to concentrate a lot of probability mass on X after observing an element in Y, is doing quite a bit of explanatory work!
This isn’t a case of 1 theory which predict the cause as being 3 different possible causes. We’re talking 3 entire competing paradigms, and then yeah, pretty much. “We think you’re sick either because people get cancer, or they have 4 bodily humors which get imbalanced, or it’s all due to malignant airs. We doctors haven’t figured out which is the right paradigm, but rest assured as you die: probably one of the 3 paradigms is right!” I sure as heck wouldn’t go around saying “medicine has it all figured out”.
So. As I said originally: macro cannot agree on an explanation for any of the events I listed, and my examples fit your demand for examples.
There isn’t this much disagreement over macro. Especially undergrad macro.
And I explained how one could use the models taught in macro principles to think about each example.
The undergrad macro you’ve already described as so simplified that it doesn’t apply to real world situations and ignores the controversy between feuding schools which bars any kind of consensus.
“With this undergrad course in the 4 humors, I hope that you will be able to use the basic principles of melancholy vs choleric etc to interpret the illnesses and personalities you see around you...”
Whatever. I’m done. I provided the relevant examples, you acknowledge that there is indeed no consensus about them, and that’s all that was needed.
Should one skip right to graduate level macroeconomics, then? Or are there companion resources one might want to consume concurrently with learning undergraduate level macro? A previous poster recommended learning undergrad with a healthy dose of scepticism; if that scepticism were applied to half-truths taught in undergrad macro, would the supposed activity of ‘learning about economics’ become an exercise in comparing maps to their charted territory?
I am not sure that given the state of the art, macro is worth learning at all at any level for people who do not plan to go into academia specializing in macro.