Funny I wouldn’t have thought a statement derived from the ideas that:
a) Religious conversion often causes a massive re-evaluation and shift in beliefs
b) Memeplexes associated with a religion (a larger memeplex host) can be pretty darn successful.
c) Theological writing has been historically more often than the rest of philosophy intellectual dynamite that inspired action and change.
d) Theology can be easily bended like law to accommodate pragmatic new strategies and tactics for its own preservation
e) Theology is often basically philosophy and philosophy was often theology.
f) LW has cultish tendencies, as do all movements. Cults actually meet the description of the OP pretty well, except for the whole mapping to reality thing.
...would be controversial. Wasn’t expecting the downvotes. Updating my model of fellow LWers.
f) LW has cultish tendencies, as do all movements. Cults actually meet the description of the OP pretty well, except for the whole mapping to reality thing.
Regardless of whether this is true, what relevance does it have to theology being an efficient producer of philosophical ideas (which it is)?
Cults/sects ect. are examples of where theological ideas have attracted a very dedicated and dynamic following. The OP list a number of similar (feel free to dispute this) features that are evidence in favour of us being a “reliably transmittable well oiled” philosophy machine. Point f) was about how surprisingly well those features map to the features of cults/sects/religions.
Why apply different standards for LW and a random sect when it comes to determining if they are a notable school of philosophy?
Also perhaps I brought it up because it wanted to signal that us being an awesome school of theology/philosophy is not strong evidence in favour of our awesomeness with epistemic rationality and no more evidence of our instrumental rationality than the success of a sect.
Also perhaps I brought it up because it wanted to signal that us being an awesome school of theology/philosophy is not strong evidence in favour of our awesomeness with epistemic rationality
This is a good point, which comes back to a comment I and some other people have made. Just because LW can produce philosophy, doesn’t mean it can produce true philosophy. Therefore we need an objective metric.
In theology it is arguably common, at least much more common than the few example the rest of philosophy provides (if we for the sake of argumetn accept theology as part of philosophy).
though I would like to know why you think theology was well oiled.
A mean lean adaptive machine. Take note of what I was commenting on:
We have here a self-updating reliably transmittable well oiled machine, the likes of which philosophy has only so rarely seen.
Really, you think training in analytic philosophy does as much to philosophically mature a student as being sequenced? It always seemed to me that it is so hard to find analytic wins, and you have to crawl and bite through so much poop before you find it, that you might be better off just reading LW and not getting into (emotionally or ascetically) those (often fascinating) mistakes. Analytic philosophy may be as reliably transmittable as LW, but I don’t think of it as well oiled. Or at least I think you would have to have a friend who has already looked through the poo to guide you to the win, in order to not get caught up in cool mistakes.
(edit): If I had to design the curriculum for philosophy students, I would reverse it. I would start with the clearest, most modern, and best reasoned positions, and then after that introduce the students to the history of mucky mess ups that lead to them. But why we would introduce students to philosophy by using the muckiest most primitive philosophy as an introduction, I could not imagine.
I meant only that analytic philosophy is a “self-updating reliably transmittable well oiled machine.” Within 30 years it took over most of philosophy in the English-speaking in world, and much of philosophy elsewhere, and in some ways it remains the dominant school, if the analytic-continental distinction works at all anymore.
Unless one counts theology as part of philosophy.
Funny I wouldn’t have thought a statement derived from the ideas that:
a) Religious conversion often causes a massive re-evaluation and shift in beliefs
b) Memeplexes associated with a religion (a larger memeplex host) can be pretty darn successful.
c) Theological writing has been historically more often than the rest of philosophy intellectual dynamite that inspired action and change.
d) Theology can be easily bended like law to accommodate pragmatic new strategies and tactics for its own preservation
e) Theology is often basically philosophy and philosophy was often theology.
f) LW has cultish tendencies, as do all movements. Cults actually meet the description of the OP pretty well, except for the whole mapping to reality thing.
...would be controversial. Wasn’t expecting the downvotes. Updating my model of fellow LWers.
Regardless of whether this is true, what relevance does it have to theology being an efficient producer of philosophical ideas (which it is)?
Cults/sects ect. are examples of where theological ideas have attracted a very dedicated and dynamic following. The OP list a number of similar (feel free to dispute this) features that are evidence in favour of us being a “reliably transmittable well oiled” philosophy machine. Point f) was about how surprisingly well those features map to the features of cults/sects/religions.
Why apply different standards for LW and a random sect when it comes to determining if they are a notable school of philosophy?
Also perhaps I brought it up because it wanted to signal that us being an awesome school of theology/philosophy is not strong evidence in favour of our awesomeness with epistemic rationality and no more evidence of our instrumental rationality than the success of a sect.
This is a good point, which comes back to a comment I and some other people have made. Just because LW can produce philosophy, doesn’t mean it can produce true philosophy. Therefore we need an objective metric.
C’mon now, I said rarely, not never. edit: though I would like to know why you think theology was well oiled.
In theology it is arguably common, at least much more common than the few example the rest of philosophy provides (if we for the sake of argumetn accept theology as part of philosophy).
A mean lean adaptive machine. Take note of what I was commenting on:
Or analytic philosophy itself.
Really, you think training in analytic philosophy does as much to philosophically mature a student as being sequenced? It always seemed to me that it is so hard to find analytic wins, and you have to crawl and bite through so much poop before you find it, that you might be better off just reading LW and not getting into (emotionally or ascetically) those (often fascinating) mistakes. Analytic philosophy may be as reliably transmittable as LW, but I don’t think of it as well oiled. Or at least I think you would have to have a friend who has already looked through the poo to guide you to the win, in order to not get caught up in cool mistakes.
(edit): If I had to design the curriculum for philosophy students, I would reverse it. I would start with the clearest, most modern, and best reasoned positions, and then after that introduce the students to the history of mucky mess ups that lead to them. But why we would introduce students to philosophy by using the muckiest most primitive philosophy as an introduction, I could not imagine.
I meant only that analytic philosophy is a “self-updating reliably transmittable well oiled machine.” Within 30 years it took over most of philosophy in the English-speaking in world, and much of philosophy elsewhere, and in some ways it remains the dominant school, if the analytic-continental distinction works at all anymore.