Here they have failed to ask a question that you know to be important.
How do I know that the question is important, though? I can’t just assume it to be so, or we get the same problem I pointed out—my conclusion that he is worse than me is just being forced by my assumptions.
Of course, if my friend says “yeah, that’s important—why didn’t I think of that?” then my conclusion is fine. But I think that’s going to be pretty rare among creationists, homeopaths, and people who think Jews eat babies.
...thinking a bunch about latent variables in the real world...
That’s why I distinguished not being sensible on a topic and not being sensible in general.
If someone is generally not sensible, I can use facts from outside a particular area to conclude that he won’t be sensible within a particular area. That’s basically using latent variables.
If someone compartmentalizes his lack of sense, so he’s only not sensible in one area (for instance, a creationist who is perfectly fine at calculating restaurant tips), this isn’t going to work.
Are you primarily thinking of this as applying to creationists etc?
The part of the reason I put the caveat ‘people about as reasonable as you’ in the first place was to exclude that category of people from what I was talking about.
That is not the central category of people I’m suggesting this for. Also, I’m not clear on why you would think it was.
I’m not using creationists as an example because it’s central; I’m using it as an example because it’s unambiguous. It’s really hard to sidetrack the argument by suggesting that maybe the creationists are right after all, or that I’m being arrogant by thinking the creationists are mistaken, etc. so creationists work well as an example.
(And an idea that works for central examples but fails for edge cases is an idea that fails.)
The part of the reason I put the caveat ‘people about as reasonable as you’ in the first place was to exclude that category of people from what I was talking about.
But if you add that exception, it swallows the rule. Most people think their opponents are more unreasonable than themselves.
(And an idea that works for central examples but fails for edge cases is an idea that fails.)
Ironically, this is not a universal criteria for the success of ideas. Sometimes its a very useful criteria (think mathematical proofs). Other times, its not a very useful idea (think ‘choosing friends’ or ‘mathematical intuitions’).
For example the idea of ‘cat’ fails for edge cases. Is this a cat? Sort of. Sort of not. But ‘cat’ is still a useful concept.
Concepts are clusters in thing space, and the concept that I am pointing at is also a cluster.
How do I know that the question is important, though? I can’t just assume it to be so, or we get the same problem I pointed out—my conclusion that he is worse than me is just being forced by my assumptions.
Of course, if my friend says “yeah, that’s important—why didn’t I think of that?” then my conclusion is fine. But I think that’s going to be pretty rare among creationists, homeopaths, and people who think Jews eat babies.
That’s why I distinguished not being sensible on a topic and not being sensible in general.
If someone is generally not sensible, I can use facts from outside a particular area to conclude that he won’t be sensible within a particular area. That’s basically using latent variables.
If someone compartmentalizes his lack of sense, so he’s only not sensible in one area (for instance, a creationist who is perfectly fine at calculating restaurant tips), this isn’t going to work.
Ahhhh, maybe I see what you’re complaining about
Are you primarily thinking of this as applying to creationists etc?
The part of the reason I put the caveat ‘people about as reasonable as you’ in the first place was to exclude that category of people from what I was talking about.
That is not the central category of people I’m suggesting this for. Also, I’m not clear on why you would think it was.
I’m not using creationists as an example because it’s central; I’m using it as an example because it’s unambiguous. It’s really hard to sidetrack the argument by suggesting that maybe the creationists are right after all, or that I’m being arrogant by thinking the creationists are mistaken, etc. so creationists work well as an example.
(And an idea that works for central examples but fails for edge cases is an idea that fails.)
But if you add that exception, it swallows the rule. Most people think their opponents are more unreasonable than themselves.
(Sorry for the long delay)
Ah, I see why you’re arguing now.
Ironically, this is not a universal criteria for the success of ideas. Sometimes its a very useful criteria (think mathematical proofs). Other times, its not a very useful idea (think ‘choosing friends’ or ‘mathematical intuitions’).
For example the idea of ‘cat’ fails for edge cases. Is this a cat? Sort of. Sort of not. But ‘cat’ is still a useful concept.
Concepts are clusters in thing space, and the concept that I am pointing at is also a cluster.
This comment on that post is especially relevant.
Maybe I’m still misunderstanding.