I know it is going to go into gnarly territority but I don’t see how the functional identity has implications about the experiences. Lets say that the emulation is going to be perfect until it hits a float overflow point where there are going to be a slight difference. Before the divergence I can’t know who I am. But when that divergence is observed I have resolved the indexical uncertainty. But it would seem that this kind of thing won’t create two “streams of experiences” at that divergence point but it was rather two streams of experiences all along that can start to tell each other appart at that point.
To make the all the possibilities of every choice to be allways the same then details of our hardwares would need to keep the same. And if we are different enough that it makes sense to call one of us an emulation then that kind of difference will always exist.
If I am in a windowless room and I know that there are 300 such rooms on earth, I am still in one room instead of being in 300 of them (regardless of whether I know there are 299 identical humans in the other rooms). Somebody that only cared about a very superficial similarity could feel like that if a person that gets the same name as I had gets born that that is “identical enough” to call that they would be “me”. Even complete data identicality does not get rid of having to take the differences into account so it is an improperly arbitrary identity.
“experiencing resurrection” has counterfactuals like “experiencing a coma”, “experiencing a deep sleep”, “experiencing an archeological limited-emulation interview”,”experiencing a lobotomized resurrection”, etc. Taking so wide a definition that all those cases are included in “resurrection” makes it so vague that it doesn’t provide much solace.
I disagree with your 300 room argument. My identity is tied to my mind, which is a computation carried out by all 300 copies of my body in these 300 rooms. If all 300 rooms were suddenly filled with sleeping gas and 299 of the copies are quietly killed, only 1 copy will wake up. However, I should expect to experience waking up with probability 1 since that is the only possible next observer moment in this set up. The 299 dead copies of me cannot generate any further observer moments since they are dead.
I’d argue that you cannot experience a coma since you’re unconscious, you can’t really experience anything when you’re in a coma. When you wake up it will feels as if you have just jumped forward in time. Deep sleep is qualitatively different and I was careful to avoid saying it is exactly like sleep, since sleep is simply a state of lowered consciousness instead of complete unconsciousness (e.g. we can still experience things like dreams). It is possible coma is also lowered consciousness like sleep, in which case you can experience comas but this says nothing about experiencing unconsciousness.
Alien looks at earth. With super-dyper tech they observe a lot of details and start predicting how one particular human will live. With super-dyper tech and galaxys worth of resources to model one planet they get good accuracy even if it is quite intensive deduction. Based on the prediction the aliens go to the predicted death event of that one particular human and copy the brain state to a flesh and blood body. They wake the reincarnation on their own planet and do interviews or whatever anthropology they set out to do (maybe even with galaxy-budjets there are resource limits and not having to simulate is economically significant).
Aliens couuld simulate faster than time ticks on earth and get a signifcant heada-up. When the body wakes up the “original” is separated by more-than-lightspeed difference. So there exists spacetime causality isolation.
When the person dies (on earth), if he would know about what the aliens did, should it give him solace? To my intuition there is no “carrying on” as there is no time connection between the death and the carnation.
Far future doing the resurrection is not useful for this point as your life would be a cause for the resurrection.
I know it is going to go into gnarly territority but I don’t see how the functional identity has implications about the experiences. Lets say that the emulation is going to be perfect until it hits a float overflow point where there are going to be a slight difference. Before the divergence I can’t know who I am. But when that divergence is observed I have resolved the indexical uncertainty. But it would seem that this kind of thing won’t create two “streams of experiences” at that divergence point but it was rather two streams of experiences all along that can start to tell each other appart at that point.
To make the all the possibilities of every choice to be allways the same then details of our hardwares would need to keep the same. And if we are different enough that it makes sense to call one of us an emulation then that kind of difference will always exist.
If I am in a windowless room and I know that there are 300 such rooms on earth, I am still in one room instead of being in 300 of them (regardless of whether I know there are 299 identical humans in the other rooms). Somebody that only cared about a very superficial similarity could feel like that if a person that gets the same name as I had gets born that that is “identical enough” to call that they would be “me”. Even complete data identicality does not get rid of having to take the differences into account so it is an improperly arbitrary identity.
“experiencing resurrection” has counterfactuals like “experiencing a coma”, “experiencing a deep sleep”, “experiencing an archeological limited-emulation interview”,”experiencing a lobotomized resurrection”, etc. Taking so wide a definition that all those cases are included in “resurrection” makes it so vague that it doesn’t provide much solace.
I disagree with your 300 room argument. My identity is tied to my mind, which is a computation carried out by all 300 copies of my body in these 300 rooms. If all 300 rooms were suddenly filled with sleeping gas and 299 of the copies are quietly killed, only 1 copy will wake up. However, I should expect to experience waking up with probability 1 since that is the only possible next observer moment in this set up. The 299 dead copies of me cannot generate any further observer moments since they are dead.
I’d argue that you cannot experience a coma since you’re unconscious, you can’t really experience anything when you’re in a coma. When you wake up it will feels as if you have just jumped forward in time. Deep sleep is qualitatively different and I was careful to avoid saying it is exactly like sleep, since sleep is simply a state of lowered consciousness instead of complete unconsciousness (e.g. we can still experience things like dreams). It is possible coma is also lowered consciousness like sleep, in which case you can experience comas but this says nothing about experiencing unconsciousness.
Scenario to tease out where my intuition diverges
Alien looks at earth. With super-dyper tech they observe a lot of details and start predicting how one particular human will live. With super-dyper tech and galaxys worth of resources to model one planet they get good accuracy even if it is quite intensive deduction. Based on the prediction the aliens go to the predicted death event of that one particular human and copy the brain state to a flesh and blood body. They wake the reincarnation on their own planet and do interviews or whatever anthropology they set out to do (maybe even with galaxy-budjets there are resource limits and not having to simulate is economically significant).
Aliens couuld simulate faster than time ticks on earth and get a signifcant heada-up. When the body wakes up the “original” is separated by more-than-lightspeed difference. So there exists spacetime causality isolation.
When the person dies (on earth), if he would know about what the aliens did, should it give him solace? To my intuition there is no “carrying on” as there is no time connection between the death and the carnation.
Far future doing the resurrection is not useful for this point as your life would be a cause for the resurrection.