I think we’re using “utility function” differently here. I take it to mean the function containing all information about your preferences, preferences about preferences, and higher level meta-preferences. I think you’re using the term to refer to the function containing just object-level preference information. Is that correct?
Now that I make this distinction, I’m not sure VNM utility applies to meta-preferences.
Now that I make this distinction, I’m not sure VNM utility applies to meta-preferences.
It doesn’t, AFAIK, which is why I said your utility function does not contain meta-preference and the whole moral dynamic. “utility function” is only a thing in VNM. Using it as a shorthand for “my whole reflective decision system” is incorrect use of the term, IMO.
I am not entirely sure that your utility function can’t contain meta-preference, though. I could be convinced by some well-placed mathematics.
My current understanding is that you put the preference uncertainty into your ontology, extend your utility function to deal with those extra dimensions, and lift the actual moral updating to epistemological work over those extra ontology-variables. This still requires some level of preliminary moral philosophy to shoehorn your current incoherent godshatter-soup into that formal framework.
I’ll hopefully formalize this some day soon to something coherent enough to be criticized.
I think we’re using “utility function” differently here. I take it to mean the function containing all information about your preferences, preferences about preferences, and higher level meta-preferences. I think you’re using the term to refer to the function containing just object-level preference information. Is that correct?
Now that I make this distinction, I’m not sure VNM utility applies to meta-preferences.
It doesn’t, AFAIK, which is why I said your utility function does not contain meta-preference and the whole moral dynamic. “utility function” is only a thing in VNM. Using it as a shorthand for “my whole reflective decision system” is incorrect use of the term, IMO.
I am not entirely sure that your utility function can’t contain meta-preference, though. I could be convinced by some well-placed mathematics.
My current understanding is that you put the preference uncertainty into your ontology, extend your utility function to deal with those extra dimensions, and lift the actual moral updating to epistemological work over those extra ontology-variables. This still requires some level of preliminary moral philosophy to shoehorn your current incoherent godshatter-soup into that formal framework.
I’ll hopefully formalize this some day soon to something coherent enough to be criticized.
I look forward to it!