by its inherent nature involves complex information processing
Interesting. There does seem to be evidence that you need a complex structure with complex information processing to provide a variety of conscious experiences. The evidence for this I think is just that outcomes have independent causes (on the smallest levels). You’d need a complex structure to take in all the different inputs and produce the corresponding conscious experience as the output. A simple structure can’t do that.
When the brain is no longer in front of you, you necessarily have to posit an *un-observable complex information processing structure in spirit land.
I wouldn’t say that. Right now, we have some data on what parts of the brain need to be active for consciousness, but we can’t measure things at a level of precision below single neurons. What if something is happening on a quantum level that underlies consciousness? What if the thing that underlies consciousness is present at a level below the quantum level, like something beyond our current understanding of physics? This is quite possible, and I don’t think it’s ridiculous to posit that this level may go undisturbed when the brain is destroyed.
So, as far as retaining “complex consciousness” (able to experience a variety of things) after the brain is destroyed, I see two possibilities:
The thing that causes the consciousness you experience when you’re alive is destroyed, but some new structure is created and provides you with complex consciousness.
The thing that is currently causing your complex consciousness remains intact, and thus continues to provide you with that complex consciousness.
I agree that 1) is unlikely for reasons of parsimony. It’s 2) that I’m questioning. Why is 2) more likely to be false than true?
Answering that question myself, I actually think that it is. If I knew more about physics I’d have a stronger opinion here, but I figure that when you destroy the brain on macro/microscopic level, it’s unlikely for the nano/quantum/small level that I’m saying consciousness might be on to go undisturbed.
So back to my original objection—“What have we observed that would tell us that x ⇒ unconsciousness”. Answer:
1) We’ve observed that the world is governed by cause and effect. Consider a given outcome. You can’t have two different physical states lead to that outcome. (I’m not explaining this well, but hopefully you know what I mean).
2) We’ve observed that consciousness involves a large variety of different outcomes (seeing red, seeing blue, feeling hot, feeling cold...). From 1) we can infer that there must be a certain physical state that leads to each of these outcomes.
3) We’ve observed that the brain is a complex structure that is correlated with consciousness. I don’t think we know the cause. Maybe it’s on the neuronal level. I think it probably has to be on a smaller level. But regardless, it seems likely that when you destroy the brain, you’d destroy whatever it is that’s producing consciousness, regardless of what level it’s on.
4) We’ve observed parsimony. So it’s unlikely that whatever causes consciousness will be regenerated out of the blue. once it’s destroyed.
So to be explicit, I think it’s unlikely that consciousness remains after the brain is destroyed.
But one thing might remain. There might be a sort of basic/flat level of consciousness, as opposed to “nothingness”. And as opposed to the idea that consciousness has to involve our complex consciousness of experiencing all the various thing we experience. There may be a basic level where we only sort of experience one thing.
If this level exists, how do we know that destroying the brain interferes with it? What do you think?
That’s all I’ve got for now. I probably haven’t expressed these points too clearly, as I’m just coming up with a lot of them and haven’t had time analyze them enough. Please let me know what you think, and if you could sum it up and express it a little more clearly than I have. Thanks for the conversation!
There might be a sort of basic/flat level of consciousness
That position is called pan-psychism. I don’t think pan-psychism violates the rules of parsimony, but I also think once you find yourself asking how quantum vacuums or a baseball bats or water molecules subjectively feel, you need to back up a bit.
If this level exists, how do we know that destroying the brain interferes with it? What do you think?
Personally? I think that my qualia is that which separates reality from all the other hypothetical mathematical structures, and just leave it at that (so I evaluate consciousness from a strictly information-processing standpoint).. Well, that’s the short version, I’d probably need to write a bit more for that to make sense.
Interesting. There does seem to be evidence that you need a complex structure with complex information processing to provide a variety of conscious experiences. The evidence for this I think is just that outcomes have independent causes (on the smallest levels). You’d need a complex structure to take in all the different inputs and produce the corresponding conscious experience as the output. A simple structure can’t do that.
I wouldn’t say that. Right now, we have some data on what parts of the brain need to be active for consciousness, but we can’t measure things at a level of precision below single neurons. What if something is happening on a quantum level that underlies consciousness? What if the thing that underlies consciousness is present at a level below the quantum level, like something beyond our current understanding of physics? This is quite possible, and I don’t think it’s ridiculous to posit that this level may go undisturbed when the brain is destroyed.
So, as far as retaining “complex consciousness” (able to experience a variety of things) after the brain is destroyed, I see two possibilities:
The thing that causes the consciousness you experience when you’re alive is destroyed, but some new structure is created and provides you with complex consciousness.
The thing that is currently causing your complex consciousness remains intact, and thus continues to provide you with that complex consciousness.
I agree that 1) is unlikely for reasons of parsimony. It’s 2) that I’m questioning. Why is 2) more likely to be false than true?
Answering that question myself, I actually think that it is. If I knew more about physics I’d have a stronger opinion here, but I figure that when you destroy the brain on macro/microscopic level, it’s unlikely for the nano/quantum/small level that I’m saying consciousness might be on to go undisturbed.
So back to my original objection—“What have we observed that would tell us that x ⇒ unconsciousness”. Answer:
1) We’ve observed that the world is governed by cause and effect. Consider a given outcome. You can’t have two different physical states lead to that outcome. (I’m not explaining this well, but hopefully you know what I mean).
2) We’ve observed that consciousness involves a large variety of different outcomes (seeing red, seeing blue, feeling hot, feeling cold...). From 1) we can infer that there must be a certain physical state that leads to each of these outcomes.
3) We’ve observed that the brain is a complex structure that is correlated with consciousness. I don’t think we know the cause. Maybe it’s on the neuronal level. I think it probably has to be on a smaller level. But regardless, it seems likely that when you destroy the brain, you’d destroy whatever it is that’s producing consciousness, regardless of what level it’s on.
4) We’ve observed parsimony. So it’s unlikely that whatever causes consciousness will be regenerated out of the blue. once it’s destroyed.
So to be explicit, I think it’s unlikely that consciousness remains after the brain is destroyed.
But one thing might remain. There might be a sort of basic/flat level of consciousness, as opposed to “nothingness”. And as opposed to the idea that consciousness has to involve our complex consciousness of experiencing all the various thing we experience. There may be a basic level where we only sort of experience one thing.
If this level exists, how do we know that destroying the brain interferes with it? What do you think?
That’s all I’ve got for now. I probably haven’t expressed these points too clearly, as I’m just coming up with a lot of them and haven’t had time analyze them enough. Please let me know what you think, and if you could sum it up and express it a little more clearly than I have. Thanks for the conversation!
That position is called pan-psychism. I don’t think pan-psychism violates the rules of parsimony, but I also think once you find yourself asking how quantum vacuums or a baseball bats or water molecules subjectively feel, you need to back up a bit.
Personally? I think that my qualia is that which separates reality from all the other hypothetical mathematical structures, and just leave it at that (so I evaluate consciousness from a strictly information-processing standpoint).. Well, that’s the short version, I’d probably need to write a bit more for that to make sense.