This isn’t a problem with Bayesianism so much as with utilitarianism giving counter-intuitive results when large numbers are involved.
Counter-intuitive!? Thats a little more than just counter-intuitive. Immagine the CEV uses this function. Doctor Evil approaches it and says that an infinite number of humans will be sacrificed if it doesn’t let him rule the world. And there are a lot more realistic problems like that to. I think the problem comes from the fact that net utility of all possible worlds and actual utility are not the same thing. I don’t know how to do it better, but you might want to think twice before you use this to make trade offs.
Ah. It seemed like you hadn’t because rather than use the example there you used a very similar case. I don’t know a universal solution either. But it should be clear that the problem exists for non-Bayesians so the dilemma isn’t a problem with Bayesianism.
Counter-intuitive!? Thats a little more than just counter-intuitive. Immagine the CEV uses this function. Doctor Evil approaches it and says that an infinite number of humans will be sacrificed if it doesn’t let him rule the world. And there are a lot more realistic problems like that to. I think the problem comes from the fact that net utility of all possible worlds and actual utility are not the same thing. I don’t know how to do it better, but you might want to think twice before you use this to make trade offs.
It would help if you read the links people give you. The situation you’ve named is essentially that in Pascal’s Mugging.
Actually I did. Thats where I got it (after you linked it). And after reading all of that, I still can’t find a universal solution to this problem.
Ah. It seemed like you hadn’t because rather than use the example there you used a very similar case. I don’t know a universal solution either. But it should be clear that the problem exists for non-Bayesians so the dilemma isn’t a problem with Bayesianism.