I formed a similar argument around vegetarianism; I predicted that it is easier for me to draw a hard line than it is to reconsider that line on a case by case basis. Rational me is more than capable of distinguishing between lobster and cow, but there is a lot of power in being able to tell myself to just eat the things with the label.
This is an extreme overapproximation but, given the moral stakes and my general unreliability, the successful results seem sufficient justification.
given the moral stakes and my general unreliability
This is a very strange thing to say. I have never felt that I can’t rely on myself not to violate my own important moral rules. Perhaps if I was an addict, but even then, I expect that having violated my moral rules I would realize that those rules weren’t really important to me.
I am a very strong satisficer, in direct conflict to my moral system which would rather I maximise, so I live under the general understanding that I’m very far from my ideal.
I formed a similar argument around vegetarianism; I predicted that it is easier for me to draw a hard line than it is to reconsider that line on a case by case basis. Rational me is more than capable of distinguishing between lobster and cow, but there is a lot of power in being able to tell myself to just eat the things with the label.
This is an extreme overapproximation but, given the moral stakes and my general unreliability, the successful results seem sufficient justification.
This is a very strange thing to say. I have never felt that I can’t rely on myself not to violate my own important moral rules. Perhaps if I was an addict, but even then, I expect that having violated my moral rules I would realize that those rules weren’t really important to me.
I am a very strong satisficer, in direct conflict to my moral system which would rather I maximise, so I live under the general understanding that I’m very far from my ideal.