...you know, a lot of what you’ve been saying over the past few days makes so much more sense now. In effect, you’re looking for the minimum intervention to prevent the Holocaust. (And it should have been possible to do that without taking control of Hitler’s actions; a sudden stroke, bolt of lightning, or well-timed meteor strike could have prevented Hitler from ever doing anything again without removing free will). Considering how much importance the universe seems to put on free will, this might be considered an even more minimal intervention (and no matter how much importance free will is assigned, one life is less than six million lives).
Which leads us directly to the question of why lightning doesn’t strike sufficiently evil people, preferably just before they do something sufficiently evil.
To which the answer, expressed in the simplest possible form, is “I don’t know”. (At best, I can theorise out loud, but it’s all going to end up circling back round to “I don’t know” in the end).
I’m pretty sure the number who hid Jews in their attics, helped them escape, etc., was a lot less than six million.
Well, if each one was helped by one person, refused help by one person, and arrested by one person, then that’s eighteen million moral dilemmas being faced. (Presumably one person could face several of these dilemmas).
Consider (1) what the Nazis did to the Jews and (2) what some less-corrupted Germans did to help the Jews. Do you really, truly, want to suggest that #2 was a greater good than #1 was an evil?
No. I don’t. I’m very sure that it’s nowhere near a complete picture of all the consequences of the Holocaust, but (2) is nowhere near (1).
...and neither (2) nor (1) (nor both of them together) are a complete accounting of all the consequences of the Holocaust.
I personally think hell is too severe a punishment even for the likes of Hitler, and did even when I was a Christian,
I have it on good authority (from a parish priests’ sermon, unfortunately he does not publish his sermons to the internet so I can’t link it) that the RCC agrees with you on this point.
Oh.
...you know, a lot of what you’ve been saying over the past few days makes so much more sense now. In effect, you’re looking for the minimum intervention to prevent the Holocaust. (And it should have been possible to do that without taking control of Hitler’s actions; a sudden stroke, bolt of lightning, or well-timed meteor strike could have prevented Hitler from ever doing anything again without removing free will). Considering how much importance the universe seems to put on free will, this might be considered an even more minimal intervention (and no matter how much importance free will is assigned, one life is less than six million lives).
Which leads us directly to the question of why lightning doesn’t strike sufficiently evil people, preferably just before they do something sufficiently evil.
To which the answer, expressed in the simplest possible form, is “I don’t know”. (At best, I can theorise out loud, but it’s all going to end up circling back round to “I don’t know” in the end).
Well, if each one was helped by one person, refused help by one person, and arrested by one person, then that’s eighteen million moral dilemmas being faced. (Presumably one person could face several of these dilemmas).
No. I don’t. I’m very sure that it’s nowhere near a complete picture of all the consequences of the Holocaust, but (2) is nowhere near (1).
...and neither (2) nor (1) (nor both of them together) are a complete accounting of all the consequences of the Holocaust.
I have it on good authority (from a parish priests’ sermon, unfortunately he does not publish his sermons to the internet so I can’t link it) that the RCC agrees with you on this point.