If you believed Westboro Baptist doctrine but still felt sensations A and B at the same times you feel them now,
...I became a Christian and determined my religious beliefs based on sensations A and B. Why would I believe in unsupported doctrine that went against what I could determine of the world? I just can’t see myself doing that. My sense of right and wrong match my religious commitments because I chose my religious commitments so they would fit with my sense of right and wrong.
but why should I believe that the oracle should be labelled Christian?
Because my built-in morality oracle likes the Christian Bible.
Doesn’t the real world behavior consistent with that strategy vaguely resemble morality?
It’s sufficient to explain some, but not all, morality. Take tarot cards, for example. What was there in the ancestral environment to make those harmful? That just doesn’t make any sense with your theory of morality-as-iterated-Prisoner’s-Dilemma.
If you picked a sect based on your moral beliefs, then that is evidence that your Christianity is moral. It is not evidence that morality is your Christianity (i.e. “A implies B” is not equivalent “B implies A”).
And if playing with tarot cards could open a doorway for demons to enter the world (or whatever wrong they cause), it seems perfectly rational to morally condemn tarot cards. I don’t morally condemn tarot cards because I think they have the same mystical powers as regular playing cards (i.e. none). Also, I’m not intending to invoke “ancestral environment” when I invoke decision theory.
And if playing with tarot cards could open a doorway for demons to enter the world (or whatever wrong they cause), it seems perfectly rational to morally condemn tarot cards.
But that’s already conditional on a universe that looks different from what most atheists would say exists. If you see proof that tarot cards—or anything else—summon demons, your model of reality takes a hit.
If you picked a sect based on your moral beliefs, then that is evidence that your Christianity is moral. It is not evidence that morality is your Christianity (i.e. “A implies B” is not equivalent “B implies A”).
If tarot cards have mystical powers, I absolutely need to adjust my beliefs about the supernatural. But you seemed to assert that decision theory can’t say that tarot are immoral in the universes where they are actually dangerous.
If you picked a sect based on your moral beliefs, then that is evidence that your Christianity is moral. It is not evidence that morality is your Christianity (i.e. “A implies B” is not equivalent “B implies A”).
I don’t understand. Can you clarify?
Alice has a moral belief that divorce is immoral. This moral belief is supported by objective evidence. She is given a choice to live in Distopia, where divorce is permissible by law, and Utopia, where divorce is legally impossible. For the most part, Distopia and Utopia are very similar places to live. Predictably, Alice chooses to live in Utopia. The consistency between Alice’s (objectively true) morality and Utopian law is evidence that Utopia is moral. It is not evidence that Utopia is the cause of Alice’s morality (i.e. is not evidence that morality is Utopian—the grammatical ordering of phrases does not help making my point).
But you seemed to assert that decision theory can’t say that tarot are immoral in the universes where they are actually dangerous.
Oh, I’m sorry. Yes, that does make sense. Decision theory WOULD assert it, but to believe they’re immoral requires belief in some amount of supernatural something, right? Hence it makes no sense under what my prior assumptions were (namely, that there was nothing supernatural).
Alice has a moral belief that divorce is immoral. This moral belief is supported by objective evidence. She is given a choice to live in Distopia, where divorce is permissible by law, and Utopia, where divorce is legally impossible. For the most part, Distopia and Utopia are very similar places to live. Predictably, Alice chooses to live in Utopia. The consistency between Alice’s (objectively true) morality and Utopian law is evidence that Utopia is moral. It is not evidence that Utopia is the cause of Alice’s morality (i.e. is not evidence that morality is Utopian—the grammatical ordering of phrases does not help making my point).
Oh, I’m sorry. Yes, that does make sense. Decision theory WOULD assert it, but to believe they’re immoral requires belief in some amount of supernatural something, right? Hence it makes no sense under what my prior assumptions were (namely, that there was nothing supernatural).
Accepting the existence of the demon portal should not impact your disbelief in a supernatural morality.
Anyways, the demons don’t even have to be supernatural. First hypothesis would be hallucination, second would be aliens.
I don’t see that decision theory cares why an activity is dangerous. Decision theory seems quite capable of imposing disincentives for poisoning (chemical danger) and cursing (supernatural danger) in proportion to their dangerousness and without regard to why they are dangerous.
The whole reason I’m invoking decision theory is to suggest that supernatural morality is not necessary to explain a substantial amount of human “moral” behavior.
...I became a Christian and determined my religious beliefs based on sensations A and B. Why would I believe in unsupported doctrine that went against what I could determine of the world? I just can’t see myself doing that. My sense of right and wrong match my religious commitments because I chose my religious commitments so they would fit with my sense of right and wrong.
Because my built-in morality oracle likes the Christian Bible.
It’s sufficient to explain some, but not all, morality. Take tarot cards, for example. What was there in the ancestral environment to make those harmful? That just doesn’t make any sense with your theory of morality-as-iterated-Prisoner’s-Dilemma.
If you picked a sect based on your moral beliefs, then that is evidence that your Christianity is moral. It is not evidence that morality is your Christianity (i.e. “A implies B” is not equivalent “B implies A”).
And if playing with tarot cards could open a doorway for demons to enter the world (or whatever wrong they cause), it seems perfectly rational to morally condemn tarot cards. I don’t morally condemn tarot cards because I think they have the same mystical powers as regular playing cards (i.e. none). Also, I’m not intending to invoke “ancestral environment” when I invoke decision theory.
But that’s already conditional on a universe that looks different from what most atheists would say exists. If you see proof that tarot cards—or anything else—summon demons, your model of reality takes a hit.
I don’t understand. Can you clarify?
If tarot cards have mystical powers, I absolutely need to adjust my beliefs about the supernatural. But you seemed to assert that decision theory can’t say that tarot are immoral in the universes where they are actually dangerous.
Alice has a moral belief that divorce is immoral. This moral belief is supported by objective evidence. She is given a choice to live in Distopia, where divorce is permissible by law, and Utopia, where divorce is legally impossible. For the most part, Distopia and Utopia are very similar places to live. Predictably, Alice chooses to live in Utopia. The consistency between Alice’s (objectively true) morality and Utopian law is evidence that Utopia is moral. It is not evidence that Utopia is the cause of Alice’s morality (i.e. is not evidence that morality is Utopian—the grammatical ordering of phrases does not help making my point).
Oh, I’m sorry. Yes, that does make sense. Decision theory WOULD assert it, but to believe they’re immoral requires belief in some amount of supernatural something, right? Hence it makes no sense under what my prior assumptions were (namely, that there was nothing supernatural).
Oh, now I understand. That makes sense.
Accepting the existence of the demon portal should not impact your disbelief in a supernatural morality.
Anyways, the demons don’t even have to be supernatural. First hypothesis would be hallucination, second would be aliens.
I don’t see that decision theory cares why an activity is dangerous. Decision theory seems quite capable of imposing disincentives for poisoning (chemical danger) and cursing (supernatural danger) in proportion to their dangerousness and without regard to why they are dangerous.
The whole reason I’m invoking decision theory is to suggest that supernatural morality is not necessary to explain a substantial amount of human “moral” behavior.