Not really. Outside of philosophy examples and my past and future selves, I don’t actually share any personal parts with anyone; the personal parts are continuity of perspective, not abstract personality traits. I can be very much like someone and still share no personal parts with him or her. Besides, that’s if I value personal uniqueness. Frankly, I’d be thrilled to discover that there are several of me. After all, Omega might take it into his head to obliterate one, and there ought to be backups.
I don’t actually share any personal parts with anyone; the personal parts are continuity of perspective, not abstract personality traits. I can be very much like someone and still share no personal parts with him or her.
The term “continuity of perspective” doesn’t reduce much beyond “identity” for me in this context. How similar can you be without sharing personal parts? If the difference is at all determined by differences in external inputs, how can you be sure that your inputs are effectively all that different?
Frankly, I’d be thrilled to discover that there are several of me. After all, Omega might take it into his head to obliterate one, and there ought to be backups.
I think the above addresses a slightly different concern. Suppose that some component of your decision-making or other subjective experience is decided by a pseudo-random number generator. It contains no interesting structure or information other than the seed it was given. If you were to create a running (as opposed to static, frozen) copy of yourself, would you prefer to keep the current seed active for both of you, or introduce a divergence by choosing a new seed for one or the other? It seems that you would create the “same amount” of personal backup either way.
Not really. Outside of philosophy examples and my past and future selves, I don’t actually share any personal parts with anyone; the personal parts are continuity of perspective, not abstract personality traits. I can be very much like someone and still share no personal parts with him or her. Besides, that’s if I value personal uniqueness. Frankly, I’d be thrilled to discover that there are several of me. After all, Omega might take it into his head to obliterate one, and there ought to be backups.
The term “continuity of perspective” doesn’t reduce much beyond “identity” for me in this context. How similar can you be without sharing personal parts? If the difference is at all determined by differences in external inputs, how can you be sure that your inputs are effectively all that different?
I think the above addresses a slightly different concern. Suppose that some component of your decision-making or other subjective experience is decided by a pseudo-random number generator. It contains no interesting structure or information other than the seed it was given. If you were to create a running (as opposed to static, frozen) copy of yourself, would you prefer to keep the current seed active for both of you, or introduce a divergence by choosing a new seed for one or the other? It seems that you would create the “same amount” of personal backup either way.