If I make a perfect copy of myself, then at the instant of duplication there exists one person at two locations. A moment later, the entities at those two locations start having non-identical experiences and entering different mental states, and thereby become different people (who aren’t one another, although both of them are me). If prior to duplication I program a device to kill me once and only once, then I die, and I have killed myself, and I continue to live.
I agree that this is a somewhat confusing way of talking, because we’re not used to life and death and identity working that way, but we have a long history of technological innovations changing the way we talk about things.
I understand completely your logic but I do not buy it because I do not agree that at the instant of the copying you have one person at two locations. They are two different people. One being the original and the other being an exact copy.
If I make a perfect copy of myself, then at the instant of duplication there exists one person at two locations. A moment later, the entities at those two locations start having non-identical experiences and entering different mental states, and thereby become different people (who aren’t one another, although both of them are me). If prior to duplication I program a device to kill me once and only once, then I die, and I have killed myself, and I continue to live.
I agree that this is a somewhat confusing way of talking, because we’re not used to life and death and identity working that way, but we have a long history of technological innovations changing the way we talk about things.
I understand completely your logic but I do not buy it because I do not agree that at the instant of the copying you have one person at two locations. They are two different people. One being the original and the other being an exact copy.
Which one is which ? And why ?
OK, cool… I understand you, then.
Can you clarify what, if anything, is uniquely valuable about a person who is an exact copy of another person?
Or is this a case where we have two different people, neither of whom have any unique value?