“When artificial intelligence researchers attempted to capture everyday statements of inference using classical logic they began to realize this was a difficult if not impossible task.”
I hope nobody’s doing this anymore. It’s obviously impossible. “Everyday statements of inference”, whatever that might mean, are not exclusively statements of first-order logic, because Russell’s paradox is simple enough to be formulated by talking about barbers. The liar paradox is also expressible with simple, practical language.
Wait a second. Wikipedia already knows this stuff is a formalization of Occam’s razor. One article seems to attribute the formalization of that principle to Solomonoff, another one to Hutter. In addition, Solomonoff induction, that is essential for both, is not computable. Ugh. So Hutter and Rathmanner actually have the nerve to begin that article by talking about the problem of induction, when the goal is obviously to introduce concepts of computation theory? And they are already familiar with Occam’s razor, and aware of it having, at least probably, been formalized?
Okay then, but this doesn’t solve the problem of induction. They have not even formalized the problem of induction in a way that accounts for the logical structure of inductive inference, and leaves room for various relevance operators to take place. Nobody else has done that either, though. I should get back to this later.
Commenting the article:
“When artificial intelligence researchers attempted to capture everyday statements of inference using classical logic they began to realize this was a difficult if not impossible task.”
I hope nobody’s doing this anymore. It’s obviously impossible. “Everyday statements of inference”, whatever that might mean, are not exclusively statements of first-order logic, because Russell’s paradox is simple enough to be formulated by talking about barbers. The liar paradox is also expressible with simple, practical language.
Wait a second. Wikipedia already knows this stuff is a formalization of Occam’s razor. One article seems to attribute the formalization of that principle to Solomonoff, another one to Hutter. In addition, Solomonoff induction, that is essential for both, is not computable. Ugh. So Hutter and Rathmanner actually have the nerve to begin that article by talking about the problem of induction, when the goal is obviously to introduce concepts of computation theory? And they are already familiar with Occam’s razor, and aware of it having, at least probably, been formalized?
Okay then, but this doesn’t solve the problem of induction. They have not even formalized the problem of induction in a way that accounts for the logical structure of inductive inference, and leaves room for various relevance operators to take place. Nobody else has done that either, though. I should get back to this later.