You are suggesting that “want” implies “ought”. One way to interpret this is as a sort of moral relativism—that if I want to punch babies, then I ought to punch babies. With this claim I would disagree strenuously.
But I’m guessing that this is not how you mean it. I’m not sure exactly what concepts of “want” and “ought” you are using.
One point you are making is that we can discuss “ought” in the context of any utility function. You do not seem to be making any claims about what utility function we should choose. You are instead arguing that there is no naturalistic source telling us what utility function to choose. You presumably wish us to pick one and discuss it?
You’re right that I didn’t mean this necessarily to be about a specifically moral sense of ‘ought’. As for the suggested inference about baby-punching, I would push that onto the ‘other things being equal’ clause, which covers a multitude of sins. No acceptable theory can entail that one ought to be punching babies, I agree.
The picture I want to suggest should be taken seriously is that on one side of the fence are naturalistic properties, on the other are properties such as rationality, having wants/beliefs, being bound by norms as to right and wrong (where this can be as meagre a sense of right and wrong as “it is right to predicate ‘cat’ of this animal and wrong to predicate ‘dog’ of it” -or, “it is right to eat this round, red thing if you desire an apple, it is wrong to eat it if you desire a pear”), oughts, goals, values, and so on. And that the fence isn’t as trivial to break down as one might think.
I’m understanding a utility function is something like a mapping of states of affairs (possible worlds?) onto, say, real numbers. In this context, the question would be giving naturalistic sense to the notion of value -that is, of something’s being better or worse for the agent in question- which the numbers here are meant to correlate to. It’s the notion of some states of affairs being more or less optimal for the agent -which I think is part of the concept of utility function- which I want to argue is outside the scope of natural science. Please correct me on utility functions if I’ve got the wrong end of the stick.
To be clear—the intent isn’t to attack the idea that there can be interesting and fruitful theories involving utility functions, rationality and related notions. It’s just that these aren’t consistent with a certain view of science and facthood.
I guess the main thing I want to suggest is that there is more than one fence that is hard/impossible to breach.
Furthermore that depending on how you define certain terms, some of the fences may or may not be breachable.
I’m also saying that non-natural “facts” are as easy to work with as natural facts. The issue that they’re not part of natural science doesn’t impact our ability to discuss them productively.
I’m also saying that non-natural “facts” are as easy to work with as natural facts. The issue that they’re not part of natural science doesn’t impact our ability to discuss them productively.
I agree entirely with this. This exercise isn’t meant in any way to be an attack on decision theory or the likes. The target is so-called naturalism—the view that all facts are natural facts.
You are suggesting that “want” implies “ought”. One way to interpret this is as a sort of moral relativism—that if I want to punch babies, then I ought to punch babies. With this claim I would disagree strenuously.
But I’m guessing that this is not how you mean it. I’m not sure exactly what concepts of “want” and “ought” you are using.
One point you are making is that we can discuss “ought” in the context of any utility function. You do not seem to be making any claims about what utility function we should choose. You are instead arguing that there is no naturalistic source telling us what utility function to choose. You presumably wish us to pick one and discuss it?
You’re right that I didn’t mean this necessarily to be about a specifically moral sense of ‘ought’. As for the suggested inference about baby-punching, I would push that onto the ‘other things being equal’ clause, which covers a multitude of sins. No acceptable theory can entail that one ought to be punching babies, I agree.
The picture I want to suggest should be taken seriously is that on one side of the fence are naturalistic properties, on the other are properties such as rationality, having wants/beliefs, being bound by norms as to right and wrong (where this can be as meagre a sense of right and wrong as “it is right to predicate ‘cat’ of this animal and wrong to predicate ‘dog’ of it” -or, “it is right to eat this round, red thing if you desire an apple, it is wrong to eat it if you desire a pear”), oughts, goals, values, and so on. And that the fence isn’t as trivial to break down as one might think.
I’m understanding a utility function is something like a mapping of states of affairs (possible worlds?) onto, say, real numbers. In this context, the question would be giving naturalistic sense to the notion of value -that is, of something’s being better or worse for the agent in question- which the numbers here are meant to correlate to. It’s the notion of some states of affairs being more or less optimal for the agent -which I think is part of the concept of utility function- which I want to argue is outside the scope of natural science. Please correct me on utility functions if I’ve got the wrong end of the stick.
To be clear—the intent isn’t to attack the idea that there can be interesting and fruitful theories involving utility functions, rationality and related notions. It’s just that these aren’t consistent with a certain view of science and facthood.
I guess the main thing I want to suggest is that there is more than one fence that is hard/impossible to breach.
Furthermore that depending on how you define certain terms, some of the fences may or may not be breachable.
I’m also saying that non-natural “facts” are as easy to work with as natural facts. The issue that they’re not part of natural science doesn’t impact our ability to discuss them productively.
I agree entirely with this. This exercise isn’t meant in any way to be an attack on decision theory or the likes. The target is so-called naturalism—the view that all facts are natural facts.
I see. That makes sense.