This was a well-written post, and I appreciated it. Even so, and even though it did better than most, I find that almost all of these kinds of discussions make the same mistake as most abstract policy and governance debates I’ve seen: they never really define the baseline for comparison. What is the world without, before, or ontologically prior to taxation that we’re judging against? I think when you insist on that as a starting point, then most of people’s specific disagreements about “Is this tax justified, when created in this context, and enforced by this mechanism?” either disappear, or become a lot smaller, or have empirically measurable resolution mechanisms, or are based on self-interest instead of any deep or generalizable justification.
Plus, unless you’re an anarchist, you’ve already conceded that there are governance structures under which it is permissible to give one entity a monopoly on the use of coercion/force/violence to control the actions of another, including the taking of possessions and the loss of physical freedom of action. Even the libertarians generally concede that this is an acceptable side effect of having a mechanism to enforce contracts. Once we set aside the anarchist option, then as the old joke goes, now we’re just negotiating on price.
I’ll give a real-world example for a world ontologically prior to redistributive taxation (and, in fact, most taxation): the US, pre-1900. Minimal taxes were collected (90% of federal government was funded by taxes on tobacco, beer, and liquor) and pretty much none of it went to redistribution. To me, it seems that there was an ideological change somewhere in the early 1900s, driven by the Progressive movement, such that Americans started to approve of redistributive taxation as a concept.
So basically what I’m saying is that the difference I outlined in my post between public-goods and redistributive taxation is real and that there are moral arguments for and against redistributive taxes as a class (rather than as individual, specific taxes), as indicated by the fact that at first only taxes for public goods like defense were inside the Overton Window, and eventually redistributive taxes became acceptable as well. It’s a difference in kind, not degree. This means it is possible to accept some amount of government coercion and yet not be ‘negotiating on price’ in rejecting forcible redistribution.
Ah, ok. True in the American context. I was thinking about things like the Roman bread dole, or religious tithing and charity laws when backed by state power. Though I guess America explicitly rejected the latter.
Edit to add: I’m a compatibilitist who is not a moral realist. I do not believe in the idea of moral desert except as a convenient (and very important and valuable!) social construct: Beyond a given society’s conventions, I believe that it is impossible in principle for anyone to deserve anything, good or bad.
The character of Death in The Hogfather basically got it right, as far as I’m concerned:
Take the universe and grind it down to the finest powder and sieve it through the finest sieve and then show me one atom of justice, one molecule of mercy. And yet you act as if there is some ideal order in the world, as if there is some...some rightness in the universe by which it may be judged
And also:.
Humans need fantasy to be human. To be the place where the falling angel meets the rising ape.
Also, funny: I’m a compatibilist non-moral-realist as well (and inspired by the Hogfather quote, too)! Morality is a social construct, and so is desert, I just find it important to think about the interplay of the two.
This was a well-written post, and I appreciated it. Even so, and even though it did better than most, I find that almost all of these kinds of discussions make the same mistake as most abstract policy and governance debates I’ve seen: they never really define the baseline for comparison. What is the world without, before, or ontologically prior to taxation that we’re judging against? I think when you insist on that as a starting point, then most of people’s specific disagreements about “Is this tax justified, when created in this context, and enforced by this mechanism?” either disappear, or become a lot smaller, or have empirically measurable resolution mechanisms, or are based on self-interest instead of any deep or generalizable justification.
Plus, unless you’re an anarchist, you’ve already conceded that there are governance structures under which it is permissible to give one entity a monopoly on the use of coercion/force/violence to control the actions of another, including the taking of possessions and the loss of physical freedom of action. Even the libertarians generally concede that this is an acceptable side effect of having a mechanism to enforce contracts. Once we set aside the anarchist option, then as the old joke goes, now we’re just negotiating on price.
Thank you for the kind words :)
I’ll give a real-world example for a world ontologically prior to redistributive taxation (and, in fact, most taxation): the US, pre-1900. Minimal taxes were collected (90% of federal government was funded by taxes on tobacco, beer, and liquor) and pretty much none of it went to redistribution. To me, it seems that there was an ideological change somewhere in the early 1900s, driven by the Progressive movement, such that Americans started to approve of redistributive taxation as a concept.
So basically what I’m saying is that the difference I outlined in my post between public-goods and redistributive taxation is real and that there are moral arguments for and against redistributive taxes as a class (rather than as individual, specific taxes), as indicated by the fact that at first only taxes for public goods like defense were inside the Overton Window, and eventually redistributive taxes became acceptable as well. It’s a difference in kind, not degree. This means it is possible to accept some amount of government coercion and yet not be ‘negotiating on price’ in rejecting forcible redistribution.
Ah, ok. True in the American context. I was thinking about things like the Roman bread dole, or religious tithing and charity laws when backed by state power. Though I guess America explicitly rejected the latter.
Edit to add: I’m a compatibilitist who is not a moral realist. I do not believe in the idea of moral desert except as a convenient (and very important and valuable!) social construct: Beyond a given society’s conventions, I believe that it is impossible in principle for anyone to deserve anything, good or bad.
The character of Death in The Hogfather basically got it right, as far as I’m concerned:
And also:.
Also, funny: I’m a compatibilist non-moral-realist as well (and inspired by the Hogfather quote, too)! Morality is a social construct, and so is desert, I just find it important to think about the interplay of the two.