So this is what’s going to stop the rich person from opting out. The threat of violence if they do so. In that light—can we still say they are allowed to opt out?
Well, in the hypothetical, yes, they can opt out. We will assume that in the hypothetical, the people would not rise up against the rich person if they voluntarily opted out of governance under some hypothetical agreement.
Can you clarify your point more? I am unsure whether you are merely making some general observation about why rich people can’t opt out of taxes in the real world, or whether you are making some theoretical argument for the implausibility of one of the assumptions in my thought experiment.
I was replying to ShemTealeaf’s claim that the rich person still has an incentive to stay—remaining under the protection of the community’s court system. I was arguing that what the rich person needs from the community’s court system is not its resources (which the rich person was providing anyway, and would dry out once they secede) but its social norms—the people’s agreement to respect it’s laws, which mean they would not attack the rich person. My point is that if the reach person’s incentive to stay is to not get robbed and killed by the community—then we can’t really say that they are allowed to opt out.
Of course—if they poor people that remain the community will not attack the rich person once they leave—then they are indeed allowed to opt out, but in that case their incentive to stay is gone.
Well, in the hypothetical, yes, they can opt out. We will assume that in the hypothetical, the people would not rise up against the rich person if they voluntarily opted out of governance under some hypothetical agreement.
Can you clarify your point more? I am unsure whether you are merely making some general observation about why rich people can’t opt out of taxes in the real world, or whether you are making some theoretical argument for the implausibility of one of the assumptions in my thought experiment.
I was replying to ShemTealeaf’s claim that the rich person still has an incentive to stay—remaining under the protection of the community’s court system. I was arguing that what the rich person needs from the community’s court system is not its resources (which the rich person was providing anyway, and would dry out once they secede) but its social norms—the people’s agreement to respect it’s laws, which mean they would not attack the rich person. My point is that if the reach person’s incentive to stay is to not get robbed and killed by the community—then we can’t really say that they are allowed to opt out.
Of course—if they poor people that remain the community will not attack the rich person once they leave—then they are indeed allowed to opt out, but in that case their incentive to stay is gone.
Oh makes sense. Because of how I was notified, I thought you were replying to me. Read my comment as if I thought you were. :)