(I assume you mean that the 1000th person is much worse than the status quo, because they will end up in a catastrophic epistemic pit. Let me know if that’s a misunderstanding.)
Is your view:
People can’t make metaphilosophical progress, but they can recognize and adopt it. The status quo is OK because there is a large diversity of people generating ideas (the best of which will be adopted).
People can’t recognize metaphilosphical progress when they see it, but better views will systematically win in memetic competition (or in biological/economic competition because their carriers are more competent).
“Metaphilosophy advances one funeral at a time,” the way that we get out of epistemic traps is by creating new humans who start out with less baggage.
Something completely different?
I still don’t understand how any of those views could imply that it is so hard for individuals to make progress if amplified. For each of those three views about why the status quo is good, I think that more than 10% of people would endorse that view and use their amplified power in a way consistent with it (e.g. by creating lots of people who can generate lots of ideas; by allowing competition amongst people who disagree, and accepting the winners’ views; by creating a supportive and safe environment for the next generation and then passing off power to that generation...) If you amplify people radically, I would strongly expect them to end up with better versions of these ideas, more often, than humanity at large.
My normal concern would be that people would drift too far too fast, so we’d end up with e.g. whatever beliefs were most memetically fit regardless of their accuracy. But again, I think that amplifying someone leaves us in a way better situation with respect to memetic competition unless they make an unforced error.
Even more directly: I think more than 1% of people would, if amplified, have the world continue on the same deliberative trajectory it’s on today. So it seems like the fraction of people you can safely amplify must be more than 1%. (And in general those people will leave us much better off than we are today, since lots of them will take safe, easy wins like “Avoid literally killing ourselves in nuclear war.”)
I can totally understand why you’d say “lots of people would mess up if amplified due to being hasty and uncareful.” But I still don’t see what could possibly make you think “99.99999% of people would mess up most of the time.” I’m pretty sure that I’m either misunderstanding your view, or it isn’t coherent.
(I assume you mean that the 1000th person is much worse than the status quo, because they will end up in a catastrophic epistemic pit. Let me know if that’s a misunderstanding.)
Is your view:
People can’t make metaphilosophical progress, but they can recognize and adopt it. The status quo is OK because there is a large diversity of people generating ideas (the best of which will be adopted).
People can’t recognize metaphilosphical progress when they see it, but better views will systematically win in memetic competition (or in biological/economic competition because their carriers are more competent).
“Metaphilosophy advances one funeral at a time,” the way that we get out of epistemic traps is by creating new humans who start out with less baggage.
Something completely different?
I still don’t understand how any of those views could imply that it is so hard for individuals to make progress if amplified. For each of those three views about why the status quo is good, I think that more than 10% of people would endorse that view and use their amplified power in a way consistent with it (e.g. by creating lots of people who can generate lots of ideas; by allowing competition amongst people who disagree, and accepting the winners’ views; by creating a supportive and safe environment for the next generation and then passing off power to that generation...) If you amplify people radically, I would strongly expect them to end up with better versions of these ideas, more often, than humanity at large.
My normal concern would be that people would drift too far too fast, so we’d end up with e.g. whatever beliefs were most memetically fit regardless of their accuracy. But again, I think that amplifying someone leaves us in a way better situation with respect to memetic competition unless they make an unforced error.
Even more directly: I think more than 1% of people would, if amplified, have the world continue on the same deliberative trajectory it’s on today. So it seems like the fraction of people you can safely amplify must be more than 1%. (And in general those people will leave us much better off than we are today, since lots of them will take safe, easy wins like “Avoid literally killing ourselves in nuclear war.”)
I can totally understand why you’d say “lots of people would mess up if amplified due to being hasty and uncareful.” But I still don’t see what could possibly make you think “99.99999% of people would mess up most of the time.” I’m pretty sure that I’m either misunderstanding your view, or it isn’t coherent.