Is there a distinction between “true will” and “false will” and how does that factor into free will?
Take the example of someone with total paralysis, or locked-in Syndrome: they are absolutely unable to move any part of their body and therefore not able to manipulate their environment. A non-deterministic view of human consciousness will still suppose that they have free-will to choose what subject is on their mind. They can listen to the ambient sounds of the room, they can imagine a blue triangle or they could choose to imagine a red hexagon.
Thankfully for me I am very much in control of all my limbs, I am able to physically manipulate my immediate environment if I choose—I can pick up and fill a glass with water[1] for example. However, if in my mind I am setting my mind to make use of my ability to manipulate my environment to grab a glass and fill it: then I’d be exercising free-will unlike a robot arm.
I can choose to imagine a red hexagon if I want. I can sometimes choose what I want to think about. But sometimes, however, I do things without thinking. I have instincts and reflexes. I also tend to ruminate, I tend to fixate on thoughts: thoughts I don’t like. I would very much like to not think about such things: embarrassing moments, framings of problems which are mal-adaptive. I also have the tendency to not be able to recall certain facts which I have, in the past without external prompting been able to recall.
To phrase my original question differently—when I become fixated on a topic, is that because I actually truly want to but I am putting up some protestations that I don’t (protestations, apparently, only to myself)? Or is that in fact against my will, my truest will, and that in the same way that a person with total paralysis is unable to pick up a glass of water—no matter how much they long to be able to interact and manipulate their environment—to hug a loved one, to walk on grass—they are unable to fulfill that will. I am unable to fulfill, at times, my will to think of something else.
Does the question of authenticity of desire determine whether something is free-will or not? Am I in fact exercising free-will even when I ruminate or turn my thoughts to things I don’t want to because that is in fact my desire?
I often wonder if free-will is a synonym for agency. And to ask a different question: How much agency, what is the most atomic example of free-will needed to say—“yup, this entity has free will”? And can we consider physical agency and freedom of thought differently?
I’m aware that there are robot arms that can do this, and a monkey could be trained to do this—I don’t think that’s relevant, I’m just saying—I’m aware of that argument.
Is there a distinction between “true will” and “false will” and how does that factor into free will?
Take the example of someone with total paralysis, or locked-in Syndrome: they are absolutely unable to move any part of their body and therefore not able to manipulate their environment. A non-deterministic view of human consciousness will still suppose that they have free-will to choose what subject is on their mind. They can listen to the ambient sounds of the room, they can imagine a blue triangle or they could choose to imagine a red hexagon.
Thankfully for me I am very much in control of all my limbs, I am able to physically manipulate my immediate environment if I choose—I can pick up and fill a glass with water[1] for example. However, if in my mind I am setting my mind to make use of my ability to manipulate my environment to grab a glass and fill it: then I’d be exercising free-will unlike a robot arm.
I can choose to imagine a red hexagon if I want. I can sometimes choose what I want to think about. But sometimes, however, I do things without thinking. I have instincts and reflexes. I also tend to ruminate, I tend to fixate on thoughts: thoughts I don’t like. I would very much like to not think about such things: embarrassing moments, framings of problems which are mal-adaptive. I also have the tendency to not be able to recall certain facts which I have, in the past without external prompting been able to recall.
To phrase my original question differently—when I become fixated on a topic, is that because I actually truly want to but I am putting up some protestations that I don’t (protestations, apparently, only to myself)? Or is that in fact against my will, my truest will, and that in the same way that a person with total paralysis is unable to pick up a glass of water—no matter how much they long to be able to interact and manipulate their environment—to hug a loved one, to walk on grass—they are unable to fulfill that will. I am unable to fulfill, at times, my will to think of something else.
Does the question of authenticity of desire determine whether something is free-will or not? Am I in fact exercising free-will even when I ruminate or turn my thoughts to things I don’t want to because that is in fact my desire?
I often wonder if free-will is a synonym for agency. And to ask a different question: How much agency, what is the most atomic example of free-will needed to say—“yup, this entity has free will”? And can we consider physical agency and freedom of thought differently?
I’m aware that there are robot arms that can do this, and a monkey could be trained to do this—I don’t think that’s relevant, I’m just saying—I’m aware of that argument.