I think you should read up on the conjunction fallacy. Your example does not address the observations made in research by Kahneman and Tversky. The questions posed in the research do not assume causal relationships, they are just two independent probabilities. I won’t rewrite the whole wiki article, but the upshot of the conjunction fallacy is that people using representativeness heuristic to asses odds, instead of using the correct procedures they would have used if that heuristic isn’t cued. People who would never say “Joe rolled a six and a two” is more likely than “Joe rolled a two” do say “Joe is a New Yorker who rides the subway” is more likely than “Joe is a New Yorker”, when presented with information about Joe.
I think you should read up on the conjunction fallacy. Your example does not address the observations made in research by Kahneman and Tversky. The questions posed in the research do not assume causal relationships, they are just two independent probabilities. I won’t rewrite the whole wiki article, but the upshot of the conjunction fallacy is that people using representativeness heuristic to asses odds, instead of using the correct procedures they would have used if that heuristic isn’t cued. People who would never say “Joe rolled a six and a two” is more likely than “Joe rolled a two” do say “Joe is a New Yorker who rides the subway” is more likely than “Joe is a New Yorker”, when presented with information about Joe.