If a coin has certain gross physical features such that a rational agent who knows those features (but NOT any details about how the coin is thrown) is forced to assign a probability p to the coin landing on “heads”, then it seems reasonable to me to speak of discovering an “objective chance” or “propensity” or whatever.
You’re saying “objective chance” or “propensity” depends on the information available to the rational agent. My understanding is that the “objective” qualifier usually denotes a probability that is thought to exist independently of any agent’s point of view. Likewise, my understanding of the term “propensity” is that it is thought to be some inherent quality of the object in question. Neither of these phrases usually refers to information one might have about an object.
You’ve divided a coin-toss experiment’s properties into two categories: “gross” (we know these) and “fine” (we don’t know these). You can’t point to any property of a coin-toss experiment and say that it is inherently, objectively gross or fine—the distinction is entirely about what humans typically know.
In short, I’m saying you agree with Eliezer, but you want to appropriate the vocabulary of people who don’t.
(I’d agree that such probabilities can be “objective” in the sense that two different agents with the exact same state of information are rationally required to have the same probability assessment. Probability isn’t a function of an individual—it’s a function of the available information.)
You’re saying “objective chance” or “propensity” depends on the information available to the rational agent. My understanding is that the “objective” qualifier usually denotes a probability that is thought to exist independently of any agent’s point of view. Likewise, my understanding of the term “propensity” is that it is thought to be some inherent quality of the object in question. Neither of these phrases usually refers to information one might have about an object.
You’ve divided a coin-toss experiment’s properties into two categories: “gross” (we know these) and “fine” (we don’t know these). You can’t point to any property of a coin-toss experiment and say that it is inherently, objectively gross or fine—the distinction is entirely about what humans typically know.
In short, I’m saying you agree with Eliezer, but you want to appropriate the vocabulary of people who don’t.
(I’d agree that such probabilities can be “objective” in the sense that two different agents with the exact same state of information are rationally required to have the same probability assessment. Probability isn’t a function of an individual—it’s a function of the available information.)