I’m guessing that the results would be significantly affected by the perceived relative status, as the offer can be more about signaling than rational choice. If the two players happen to perceive the relative status similarly, or if the second player perceives equal or larger status disparity, s/he will likely accept. Maybe even think of the first player as foolish for offering too much and being a lousy bargainer. A rejection would often be due to the status-related outrage (“Who does s/he think s/he is to offer me only a pittance?”)
So, if you think that being in control of how much to offer raises your status, you are likely to offer less, and if you think that not having any say in the amount automatically makes you lower status, you would be likely to accept a low offer.
Thus I would expect that in a society where equality is not considered an unalienable right, but is rather determined by material possessions, the average accepted offer would be lower. Not sure if this matches the experimental results.
I’m guessing that the results would be significantly affected by the perceived relative status, as the offer can be more about signaling than rational choice. If the two players happen to perceive the relative status similarly, or if the second player perceives equal or larger status disparity, s/he will likely accept. Maybe even think of the first player as foolish for offering too much and being a lousy bargainer. A rejection would often be due to the status-related outrage (“Who does s/he think s/he is to offer me only a pittance?”)
So, if you think that being in control of how much to offer raises your status, you are likely to offer less, and if you think that not having any say in the amount automatically makes you lower status, you would be likely to accept a low offer.
Thus I would expect that in a society where equality is not considered an unalienable right, but is rather determined by material possessions, the average accepted offer would be lower. Not sure if this matches the experimental results.