Wei_Dai is saying that all the other copies of you that didn’t win lost more than enough utility to make up for it. This is far from a universally accepted utility measure, of course.
Had the money more than made up for it, it would have been rational from a normal expected-utility perspective to play the lottery. My scenario was assuming that, with sufficient computational power, you would know that playing the lottery wasn’t rational.
We’re not disagreeing about the value of the lottery—it was, by stipulation, a losing bet—we are disagreeing about the proper attitude towards the news of having won the lottery.
I don’t think I understand the difference in opinion well enough to discover the origin of it.
Wei_Dai is saying that all the other copies of you that didn’t win lost more than enough utility to make up for it. This is far from a universally accepted utility measure, of course.
So Wei_Dai’s saying the money doesn’t more than make up for? That’s clever, but I’m not sure it actually works.
Had the money more than made up for it, it would have been rational from a normal expected-utility perspective to play the lottery. My scenario was assuming that, with sufficient computational power, you would know that playing the lottery wasn’t rational.
We’re not disagreeing about the value of the lottery—it was, by stipulation, a losing bet—we are disagreeing about the proper attitude towards the news of having won the lottery.
I don’t think I understand the difference in opinion well enough to discover the origin of it.
I must have misunderstood you, then. I think that we agree about having a positive attitude toward having won.