Part of the case for using a utility maximization framework is that we can see that many agents naturally use an internal representation of utility. This is true for companies, and other “economic” actors. It is true to some extent for animal brains—and it is true for many of the synthetic artificial agents that have been constructed. Since so many agents are naturally utility-based, that makes the framework an obvious modelling medium for intelligent agents.
I see no problem modeling computable agents without even mentioning “utility”.
Similarly, you can model serial computers without mentioning Turing machines and parallel computers without mentioning cellular automata. Yet in those cases, the general abstraction turns out to be a useful and important concept. I think this is just the same.
You have an alternative model of arbitrary computable agents to propose?
You don’t think the ability to model an arbitrary computable agent is useful?
What is the problem here? Surely a simple utility-based framework for modelling the computable agent of your choice is an obvious Good Thing.
I see no problem modeling computable agents without even mentioning “utility”.
I don’t yet see how modeling them as irrational utility maximizers is useful, since a non-utility-based approach will probably be simpler.
Part of the case for using a utility maximization framework is that we can see that many agents naturally use an internal representation of utility. This is true for companies, and other “economic” actors. It is true to some extent for animal brains—and it is true for many of the synthetic artificial agents that have been constructed. Since so many agents are naturally utility-based, that makes the framework an obvious modelling medium for intelligent agents.
Similarly, you can model serial computers without mentioning Turing machines and parallel computers without mentioning cellular automata. Yet in those cases, the general abstraction turns out to be a useful and important concept. I think this is just the same.