It seems as if your argument rests on the assertion that my access to facts about my physical condition is at least as good as my access to facts about the limitations of computation/simulation. You say the ‘physical limitations’, but I’m not sure why ‘physical’ in my universe is particularly relevant—what we care about is whether it’s reasonable for there to be many simulations of someone like me over time or not.
I don’t think this assertion is correct. I can make a statement about the limits of computation / simulation—i.e. that there is at least enough simulation power in the universe to simulate me and everything I am aware of, that is true whether I am in a simulation or in a top level universe, or even whether I believe in matter and physics at all.
I believe that this assertion, that the top level universe contains at least enough simulation power to simulate someone like myself and everything of which they are aware is something that I have better evidence for than the assertion that I have physical hands.
Have I misunderstood the argument, or do you disagree that I have better evidence for a minimum bound to simulation power than for any specific physical attribute?
It seems as if your argument rests on the assertion that my access to facts about my physical condition is at least as good as my access to facts about the limitations of computation/simulation. You say the ‘physical limitations’, but I’m not sure why ‘physical’ in my universe is particularly relevant—what we care about is whether it’s reasonable for there to be many simulations of someone like me over time or not.
I don’t think this assertion is correct. I can make a statement about the limits of computation / simulation—i.e. that there is at least enough simulation power in the universe to simulate me and everything I am aware of, that is true whether I am in a simulation or in a top level universe, or even whether I believe in matter and physics at all.
I believe that this assertion, that the top level universe contains at least enough simulation power to simulate someone like myself and everything of which they are aware is something that I have better evidence for than the assertion that I have physical hands.
Have I misunderstood the argument, or do you disagree that I have better evidence for a minimum bound to simulation power than for any specific physical attribute?