One thing you’ve left out of the analysis is the cost of the signal. An ivy league degree may or may not be mostly signal, but either way, very few low status people will be able to get one.
So, one way that signals can lose their meaning is if the cost drops. Take the example of buying a drink. If drinks are expensive, then buying drinks for women you don’t know is a costly signal. (Note that there’s an equilibrium here; the more successful the tactic becomes, the less costly the signal becomes.) As we all become wealthier and the relative price of drinks goes down, the statement being made about disposable income goes away, and it becomes just a ritual.
I would say, then, that the primary driver for a signal to expire is not for it to be common knowledge that it’s a signal, but for it to be common knowledge that it’s a cheap signal. Knowing which signals to pay attention to reduces to the question of accurately estimating how costly it is.
If the signal costs more, it just indicates the person can pay for that signal. There are people who waste a large proportion of their income on rolex watches to appear wealthier; doesn’t mean that they are.
However, signals that cost more may be more accurate than ones that don’t cost as much. This doesn’t mean that they can’t expire or at least not work as well. Plus, when status-seeking behavior is better understood by everyone, only costly (and accurate) signals will be possible.
If the signal costs more, it just indicates the person can pay for that signal.
That’s the point. Signals that we find impressive, like rolex watches are impressive because our instincts are calibrated to assume that the ability to “just pay for that signal” is an incredibly significant measure.
I would say, then, that the primary driver for a signal to expire is not for it to be common knowledge that it’s a signal, but for it to be common knowledge that it’s a cheap signal. Knowing which signals to pay attention to reduces to the question of accurately estimating how costly it is.
I agree. However, monetary cost is not the only such factor—the same logic applies to signals that require dedication to acquire and/or are difficult to acquire (learning to play a musical instrument, for instance). Note that the ivy league degree is difficult and requires dedication as well as being expensive, making it a very difficult-to-fake signal of status.
One thing you’ve left out of the analysis is the cost of the signal. An ivy league degree may or may not be mostly signal, but either way, very few low status people will be able to get one.
So, one way that signals can lose their meaning is if the cost drops. Take the example of buying a drink. If drinks are expensive, then buying drinks for women you don’t know is a costly signal. (Note that there’s an equilibrium here; the more successful the tactic becomes, the less costly the signal becomes.) As we all become wealthier and the relative price of drinks goes down, the statement being made about disposable income goes away, and it becomes just a ritual.
I would say, then, that the primary driver for a signal to expire is not for it to be common knowledge that it’s a signal, but for it to be common knowledge that it’s a cheap signal. Knowing which signals to pay attention to reduces to the question of accurately estimating how costly it is.
If the signal costs more, it just indicates the person can pay for that signal. There are people who waste a large proportion of their income on rolex watches to appear wealthier; doesn’t mean that they are.
However, signals that cost more may be more accurate than ones that don’t cost as much. This doesn’t mean that they can’t expire or at least not work as well. Plus, when status-seeking behavior is better understood by everyone, only costly (and accurate) signals will be possible.
That’s the point. Signals that we find impressive, like rolex watches are impressive because our instincts are calibrated to assume that the ability to “just pay for that signal” is an incredibly significant measure.
Don’t you think that if more people knew about status-seeking behaviors, more accurate, and therefore more costly, signals would be used?
I agree. However, monetary cost is not the only such factor—the same logic applies to signals that require dedication to acquire and/or are difficult to acquire (learning to play a musical instrument, for instance). Note that the ivy league degree is difficult and requires dedication as well as being expensive, making it a very difficult-to-fake signal of status.